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ABSTRACT
In this master’s thesis, we analyze the relation between the IRMA (“I Reveal My Attributes”)
system and the Verifiable Credential (VC) standard. By contrasting and comparing IRMA
with VC, we identify similarities and differences.
IRMA is a practical, privacy-friendly, and user-centric identity system. It is user-centric
as the user, and not the identity provider, is the central role within the system. The goal
of the VC standard is to advance interoperability between user-centric identity systems. A
deliverable of the VC standard is a data model with related concepts and syntax. Hence, we
look into possibilities on how to extend IRMA’s interoperability by making IRMA compliant
with the VC standard.
Several concepts between IRMA and VC overlap, such as claims and credentials. A cre-
dential is a set of claims, for instance, a full name or address of a subject. The credential
is produced and signed by an issuing party, such as the government. A credential is verifi-
able if the claims can be cryptographically verified. Also, IRMA employs Zero-Knowledge
Proofs, and VC supports the use of Zero-Knowledge Proofs.
We identify the relevant requirements of the VC data model and real-world use-cases
between IRMA and other VC-compliant systems. Based on the requirements and use-cases,
we describe modifications needed within IRMA. We suggest introducing a metadata server,
which can deliver data from IRMA schemes to external actors via HTTP endpoints. When
accepting messages from other VC-compliant systems, IRMA’s security properties can be
significantly impacted.
We implement a subset of the identified modifications to compute VC-compliant mes-
sages within IRMA. The developed prototype can exchange those messages between IRMA
components. We publish the modifications of the irmago and irma_mobile components
via forks on GitHub. The limitation is that we do not modify the IRMA data model to com-
ply with the VC data model as this is out-of-scope of this research.
We conclude that after modifying IRMA to comply with the VC standard, IRMA extends
its interoperability by at least reaching level three of the “levels of conceptual interoperabil-
ity model” (LCIM). However, it is one thing to make a system compliant with a standard. It
is another to exchange messages with other VC-compliant systems as those might use dif-
ferent protocols, APIs, and other technology such as blockchains.
We recommend the Privacy By Design Foundation to modify IRMA to comply with the
VC standard. An advantage might be to become a pioneer in the field within the Nether-
lands or even the EU. This can increase PbDF’s visibility and impact. In general, the in-
teroperability of user-centric IMS should get more focus within institutions and industry.
Consequently, citizens may see the benefits of such interoperable systems. Additionally, it
can reduce the resistance against such systems.
ix
SAMENVATTING
In deze masterscriptie analyseren we de relatie tussen het IRMA (“I Reveal My Attributes”)
systeem en de Verifiable Credential (VC) standaard. Door IRMA te contrasteren en te vergeli-
jken met VC identificeren we overeenkomsten en verschillen.
IRMA is een praktisch, privacy-vriendelijk en gebruikersgericht identiteitssysteem. Het
is gebruikersgericht want de gebruiker, en niet de identity provider, is de centrale rol binnen
het systeem. Het doel van de VC-standaard is om de interoperabiliteit tussen gebruikers-
gerichte identiteitssystemen te bevorderen. Een product van de VC-standaard is een data
model met bijbehorende concepten en syntax. Daarom onderzoeken we de mogelijkhe-
den om de interoperabiliteit van IRMA uit te breiden door IRMA te laten voldoen aan de
VC-standaard.
Verschillende concepten tussen IRMA en VC overlappen, zoals claims en credentials.
Een credential is een set van claims, bijvoorbeeld een volledige naam of adres. De creden-
tiaal wordt geproduceerd en ondertekend door een uitgevende partij, zoals de regering.
Een credentiaal is verifieerbaar als de claims cryptografisch kunnen worden geverifieerd.
Ook maakt IRMA gebruik van Zero-Knowledge Proofs en VC ondersteunt het gebruik van
Zero-Knowledge Proofs.
We identificeren de relevante vereisten van het VC-data model en praktijkgevallen tussen
IRMA en andere VC-compliant systemen. Op basis van de eisen en use-cases beschrijven
we de benodigde aanpassingen binnen IRMA. We stellen voor een metadata server in te
voeren, die via HTTP-eindpunten gegevens van IRMA-schema’s aan externe actoren kan
leveren. Bij het accepteren van berichten van andere VC-compatibele systemen kunnen de
beveiligingseigenschappen van IRMA aanzienlijk worden beïnvloed.
We implementeren een deelverzameling van de geïdentificeerde wijzigingen om VC-
conforme berichten binnen IRMA te berekenen. Het ontwikkelde prototype kan deze berichten
uitwisselen tussen IRMA-componenten. We publiceren de modificaties van de irmago en
irma_mobile componenten via forks op GitHub. De beperking is dat we het IRMA data
model niet aanpassen om te voldoen aan het VC data model, omdat dit buiten scope van
dit onderzoek valt.
We concluderen dat na het aanpassen van IRMA om te voldoen aan de VC standaard,
IRMA haar interoperabiliteit uitbreidt met tenminste het bereiken van niveau drie van de
“levels of conceptual interoperability model” (LCIM). Het is echter één ding om een sys-
teem te laten voldoen aan een standaard. Het is een ander ding om berichten uit te wis-
selen met andere VC-conforme systemen, omdat die andere protocollen, API’s en andere
technologie zoals blockchains kunnen toepassen.
We raden de Privacy By Design Foundation aan om IRMA aan te passen aan de VC-
standaard. Een voordeel zou kunnen zijn een pionier te worden op dit gebied binnen Ned-
erland of zelfs de EU. Dit kan de zichtbaarheid en impact van PbDF vergroten. In het alge-
meen zou de interoperabiliteit van gebruikersgerichte IMS meer aandacht moeten krijgen
binnen instellingen en het bedrijfsleven. De burger kan dan ook de voordelen van dergeli-





Attribute An assertion made about a subject, also referred to as claim.
Claim An assertion made about a subject, also referred to as attribute.
Credential A set of one or more claims made by an issuer about one or more subjects.
Holder A role possessing one or more credentials.
Issuer A role asserting claims about one or more subjects, creating a credential from these
claims, and transmitting the credential to a holder.
Linked data Data that is interlinked with other data to get context. It can be queried by
software.
Presentation Data derived from one or more verifiable credentials that is shared with a
specific verifier.
Proof Same as Signature.
Scheme A data structure within IRMA containing information about issuers, credential
types, and attribute names).
Scheme manager A role within IRMA. It maintains and distributes one or more IRMA scheme(s).
Signature A (in our case digital) signature is a technique for verifying the authenticity of
digital messages.
Subject A thing about which claims are made.
User-centric IMS A decentral IMS putting the user in control of her data.
Verifiable Credential A tamper-evident credential signed by an issuer that can be crypto-
graphically verified.
Verifiable Presentation A verifiable presentation is a tamper-evident presentation. Au-
thorship of the data can be trusted after a process of cryptographic verification.




“Study after study has shown that human behavior changes when we know we’re being
watched. Under observation, we act less free, which means we effectively are less free.”
(Edward Snowden, from his book Permanent Record).
1.1. PROBLEM CONTEXT AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Traditionally, most operating identity management systems (IMS) have one essential flaw.
According to Allen [43], the flaw is that centralized authorities have control over the identi-
ties of individuals, for instance, Facebook or Google. This is referred to as “service-centric”.
Individuals are bound to the central authority and do not have complete control of their
identity. For instance, individuals can not transfer their identity from Facebook to Google
or vice versa. An identity of an individual consists of attributes, also called claims, about
the individual, for example, her birth date or e-mail address.
Also, organizations in both public and private sectors exchange personal information
of individuals, and individuals do not know precisely in which ways. In recent years, the
online-advertisement industry is a notable example. In particular, the Facebook-Cambridge
Analytica data scandal, in which Cambridge Analytica harvested personal data from mil-
lions of Facebook users.1 They used the data mainly for political advertising.
Consequently, a recent survey shows that only 49% of the US and UK population feels
in control of their data online.2 Chaum argues [9] already more than 30 years ago that the
collection of personal data can lead to a dossier society, like the one described in Orwell’s
dystopian novel 1984 [30]. Such a society can result in that the privacy of individuals di-
minishes.
Already for many years, scientists and the SE-community have researched concepts to
enhance the privacy of individuals. Jøsang and Pope [19] introduce the concept of “user-
centric identity management”. “User-centric” means that the individual becomes the cen-
tral entity in the IMS. Consequently, individuals can control which parts of their identity
1See the coverage by the New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/
cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html?module=inline




they share with which party. This concept leads to a decentral architecture, in which iden-
tity providers (IdPs) and service providers (SPs) do not need to interact directly with each
other. Hence, IdPs are not aware of the SPs the individual is visiting.
To be able to exchange information between the different parties, Chaum [9] introduces
the notion of credentials. A credential contains a set of claims about a subject. In most
cases, the individual is the subject and also the holder of the credential. Usually, an IdP, also
called issuer, returns the credentials to the individual after the individual authenticated.
Subsequently, the credential(s) are stored within a safe environment, which only the indi-
vidual can access. Then, the individual can release parts of their credentials to any SP, also
called verifier, to gain access to resources.
Recently, organizations have developed working products based on the idea of a user-
centric IMS and its related concepts. As technology advances, it becomes easier and cheaper
to develop such products. Two recent projects to mention here are Sovrin and IRMA. The
non-profit Sovrin Foundation established Sovrin in 2016.3 In this research, we focus pri-
marily on the IRMA (“I Reveal My Attributes”) project, which the non-profit Privacy by De-
sign Foundation (PbDF) established in 2015.4 The goal of IRMA is to make user-centric and
privacy-friendly identity systems more practical, according to Alpar et al. [2]. The central
component within IRMA is the IRMA mobile app. Within the app, individuals can store
their credentials received from issuers. Then, via the mobile app, individuals can disclose
parts of their credentials to verifiers. Both issuers and verifiers need to deploy an IRMA
server to establish a session with any individual using the IRMA app.
However, according to Kim and Kankanhalli [20], individuals usually have resistance
against new information systems implementations, referred to as the status quo bias. Addi-
tionally, if all user-centric systems operate independently, the resistance grows even more
due to several reasons. First, individuals need to use for each system another safe environ-
ment to store their credentials from that system. Consequently, individuals are not able to
receive and disclose credentials across systems. Second, credentials from different systems
can contain the same sets of attributes. For instance, a citizen wants to use his "Basisregis-
tratie Personen" attributes both with Sovrin and IRMA. Then, she needs both apps, which
store the same attributes. This can be confusing for individuals. Third, participating orga-
nizations or institutions need to deploy different servers for each system. For example, if a
verifier wants to accept both Sovrin and IRMA attributes, currently, it needs to deploy both
a Sovrin and IRMA server. To sum up, several reasons may threaten the public acceptance
of the concept of user-centric IMS and related products.
Therefore, the worldwide web consortium (W3C) established a working group. The
working group had the goal to address the problem that there is no privacy-enhancing stan-
dard to enable individuals to express and transact claims. In 2019, they finished their work,
and published a standard titled Verifiable Credentials (VCs) [47] as an official recommen-
dation. A VC is defined as “a tamper-evident credential that has authorship that can be
cryptographically verified”. The standard consists of an unambiguous specification, which
defines the syntax and semantics of VCs. By conforming to the specification, user-centric
IMSs might extend their interoperability by being able to exchange messages with other
systems that conform to the specification.
In this research, we explore the relation between the IRMA system and the VC standard.
3See https://sovrin.org/
4See https://privacybydesign.foundation/en/
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We thereby make the following contributions:
• We identify similarities and differences between IRMA and VC by comparing and
contrasting the two. Key concepts between the two overlap. We describe how to map
VC entities to IRMA’s data model.
• We analyze which requirements of VC are relevant, as not all requirements within the
standard are mandatory.
• We describe four relevant real-world use-cases for IRMA when connecting with ex-
ternal actors. First, an external issuer issues credential to an IRMA user. Second, an
IRMA user discloses credentials to an external verifier. Third, an IRMA issuer issues
credentials to a non-IRMA user. And fourth, a non-IRMA user discloses credentials
to an IRMA verifier.
• Based on the requirements and use-cases, we describe the necessary modifications
that are needed within IRMA.
• We conduct an architectural impact analysis based on SACCS. We introduce the meta-
data server, which delivers scheme information to external actors. If IRMA wants to
exchange messages with other VC-compliant systems, it can heavily impact IRMA’s
security properties.
• We build a prototype implementing a subset of the identified modifications. Subse-
quently, we prove that the prototype works as intended by exchanging VC-compliant
messages between IRMA components.
• We describe goals and deliverables of related and this work.
• We discuss how VC extends IRMA’s interoperability. By modifying IRMA to comply
with the VC standard, IRMA at least reaches level three of the “levels of conceptual
interoperability model”.
• We list costs and benefits of making IRMA comply with the VC-standard.
• We specify activities for the PbDF to conduct when wanting to connect with another
VC-compliant system.
• For the PbDF, we list ideas for future work. First, researching about decentralizing the
IRMA scheme. Second, connect with another VC-compliant system. Third, study VC
concepts currently not supported by IRMA. Fourth, study related standards or RFCs.
And fifth, study non-technical challenges.
• For the W3C, we give ideas for improving their process and communication.
1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
As previously stated, the objective of this research is to explore the relation between the
IRMA system and the Verifiable Credential standard.
This objective can be decomposed into several Research Questions (RQs), which in turn
can be decomposed into several sub-questions:
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RQ1 To what extent is it possible to align the data model and concepts of the IRMA system
with the data model and concepts of the VC standard?
RQ1.1 What are the concepts and data model of the IRMA system?
RQ1.2 What are the concepts and data model of the VC standard?
RQ1.3 What are the similarities and differences in both IRMA and VC? By contrasting and
comparing the two topics, we get a clear picture of how VC might improve IRMA.
RQ2 How to modify the IRMA system to be compliant with the VC standard and to be able
to exchange messages with other VC-compliant systems?
RQ2.1 How can we identify relevant requirements? In the VC data model there are several
classifications of requirements. We need to identify the relevant ones.
RQ2.2 Which relevant use-cases can be identified? By identifying use-cases, we can ana-
lyze further which distinct challenges exist when adapting IRMA to exchange mes-
sages with other systems.
RQ2.3 What are the effects on IRMA’s architecture? In particular, we want to show what
the impact is on security, as IRMA guarantees specific security properties.
RQ2.4 Which modifications can be implemented in a prototype? We can describe which
modifications fit within the scope of this research.
RQ2.5 How to validate that those modifications work? After applying modifications, we
want to show that those work as intended.
RQ3 How do the modifications help to extend IRMA’s interoperability? As an essential goal
of VC is to provide us with an interoperable standard, we want to exhibit how the
modifications help to extend the interoperability of IRMA.
RQ4 Which recommendations can be provided to the IRMA project based on the experi-
ences of this research? Recommendations can support IRMA stakeholders for mak-
ing decisions with regards to VC and interoperability.
RQ5 Which recommendations can be provided to the W3C based on the experiences of
this project? As we had to analyze the VC standard in detail, possibly we can provide
the W3C with recommendations on how to improve.
In chapter 2, research process, we explain how we set up the process to get answers to
the different questions.
1.3. THESIS OVERVIEW
The paper is organized as follows. In chapter 2, I explain the research process, which I ap-
plied to conduct the research. In the third chapter, I give the interested reader more back-
ground information on relevant topics, in particular identity management, linked data, and
interoperability of software systems. In chapter 4, I describe in detail both IRMA and VC.
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Subsequently, I compare and contrast the two. In chapter 5, I identify requirements, mod-
ifications, and analyze the impact of the modifications on IRMA’s architecture. In chapter
6, I describe the developed prototype and how I validated it. In chapter 7, I list related
work and put it into context with this research. In chapter 8, I discuss the findings and
limitations of the thesis. Additionally, I provide recommendations for both the PbDF and
W3C. In chapter 9, I draw conclusions based on the identified relation of IRMA and VC. In
appendix F I evaluate my personal experience carrying out this research.
2
RESEARCH PROCESS
Within empirical research, usually, data is collected. Subsequently, researchers use this
data to answer knowledge questions; Wieringa [39] calls it the “empirical cycle”. However,
within this research, we want to explore a relation between two topics related to software.
This can result in some software design and, possibly, some form of working software. Col-
lecting data can help us to explore this relation, but it does not play a central role as it does
within typical empirical research. Hence, for our research, it would be beneficial to find a
research method that provides us with tools to support our research and its process.
According to Wieringa [39], “design science is the design and investigation of artifacts
in context”. In this research, indeed, we want to create one or more artifacts, such as a
software design or working software. It can support us in understanding the relationship
between IRMA and VC, and improve IRMA. Based on design science, Peffers et al. [31] de-
veloped a process model, called Design Science Research Methodology (DSRM), providing
the IT research community with a process framework. The DSRM process consists of six
activities. First, the problem identification and motivation activity defines the problem and
argues why the proposed solution will be of value. Second, within the defining the objec-
tives for a solution activity, as the name already suggests, the objectives are defined for a
possible solution. Third, in the design and development activity, the actual artifact is cre-
ated, thereby figuring out the desired functionality and architecture. In the fourth activity,
demonstration, it needs to be demonstrated that the created artifact contributes to solving
the stated problem, which can involve experimentation or simulations. Fifth, in the evalu-
ation activity, researchers need to observe or measure how well the artifacts supports a so-
lution to the problem. It can take various forms, such as a comparison of the artifact’s func-
tionality with the objective stated in the second activity, or conducting interviews. Within
this activity, researchers can decide to jump back to previous activities to try to improve the
effectiveness of the artifact. In the last activity, communication, researchers communicate
the results to relevant audiences.
Based on the process model proposed by Peffers et al. [31], we develop a research pro-
cess, as shown in 2.1. In the figure, we summarize for each activity, how we approach it,
and which research questions (RQ) we aim to answer with it. In the following paragraphs,
we describe the activities in more detail.
While my supervisor Greg Alpar provided us with the topic, we still have to discover
which problem we want to solve with this research. Consequently, we take a problem-
centered initiation. Therefore, in the first activity identify problem and motivate, we first
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Figure 2.1: Applied DSRM process
need to understand both topics IRMA and VC in greater detail by studying previous work
and reading online documentation of both. This information enables us to compare and
contrast the two to identify which problems or challenges VC can help to solve within
IRMA.
Then, in the following activity, define objectives of a solution, we identify the relevant
requirements of VC. Also, we investigate which actual real-world use-cases we want to solve
by modifying IRMA.
In the third activity, design and development, we first conduct an architectural impact
analysis. We focus on security aspects, as those are advertised explicitly on IRMA’s website.
Then, we build a prototype, which implements a subset of the identified modifications.
In the fourth activity, demonstration, we demonstrate that the created prototype works
as described. We are not able to establish active collaboration with other VC projects or the
VC community itself during the time of conducting the research. Hence, we set up IRMA
in such a way that the different IRMA components exchange VC-compliant messages with
each other.
The evaluation activity consists of two steps. First, we evaluate how the results of the
previous activities support a solution to the identified problem, that is, extend IRMA’s inter-
operability. We also take related work into account. Second, we provide recommendations
to both the PbDF and the W3C.
The communication activity involves publishing this master thesis, and after finalizing
this thesis, defending the results in an oral form of presentation.
Lastly, based on the evaluation, we can jump back to earlier activities, in particular,
refining the objectives. Feedback on the final draft version of the thesis and feedback on
practice presentations help us to improve this work further.
To summarize, the DSRM process helps us to structure our research process more ad-
vantageously than traditional empirical research. The creation of an artifact stays central
in our research rather than the collection of data to answer knowledge questions. The pro-
vided artifact(s) can help the IRMA project to evaluate if it is feasible to make IRMA com-
pliant with the VC standard in practice.
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In this chapter, we give the interested reader more information on three topics used later
in this research. We start by describing briefly what identity management (IdM) is and
how it has evolved over the years. Also, we briefly describe trust relationships between dif-
ferent actors within IdM. Then, we introduce technologies used in practice, in particular
attribute-based credentials (ABCs), blockchain, and decentralized identifiers (DID). Addi-
tionally, we introduce three current user-centric IMSs projects, Sovrin, uPort, and Verifiable
Credentials Ltd. As linked data plays a vital role within VC, we introduce it shortly. We intro-
duce the concept of interoperability as one essential goal of software standards such as VC
is to extend interoperability between software systems. We show what its benefits are, and
we describe a model that can help to determine the degree of interoperability of software
systems.
3.1. IDENTITY MANAGEMENT
Identity management (IdM) is the management of identities of individuals. IdM is also
known as identity and access management (IAM). The goal of identity management is to
ensure that people with proper identity are authorized to access adequate resources. Pfitz-
mann et al. [33] define identity as follows: “An identity is any subset of attribute values of a
person, which sufficiently identifies this person within any set of persons. So usually there
is no such thing as ’the identity’, but several of them”. As shown in figure 3.1, every in-
dividual in the world has specific attributes linked to them, inherent to that individual, for
example, her birth date or nationality. SPs request a subset of those attributes to identify an
individual. Each identity is identified via an identifier, which can be personally-identifying,
such as your name, or not personally-identifying, such as a unique computed id. Identifiers
enable a system to distinguish that identity from all other identities within that system.
According to Dhamdhere and Karande [14], we can classify components of IdM into
four major categories: authentication, authorization, user management, and central user
repository. The authentication category consists of authentication and session manage-
ment. It means, that after a user is authenticated by, for example, either providing user-
name and password combination or disclosing attributes, a system creates a session. The
system uses the session during interactions between the user and the system. The autho-
rization module determines whether a user is granted access to a resource by checking
the user’s identity against authorization policies. The user management category consists
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Figure 3.1: Alice’s partial identities (from Clauß and Köhntopp [12])
of the set of administrative functions needed to manage the user, for example, the reg-
istration process, or password, and role/group management. Another critical concept is
self-service, whereby the users take care that their identity data is accurate. Commonly,
the central user repository stores identity information and shares it with other systems or
services if needed. The most well-known technologies to mention here are LDAP, an open
protocol, or Active Directory (AD) from Microsoft, a directory service.
3.1.1. EVOLUTION
Allen [43] describes four phases that IdM has gone through since the existence of the inter-
net, thereby addressing the issue with central authorities.
In the first phase, centralized identity, one central authority is responsible for dealing
with identities. The holder of the claim is always dependent on this authority, whether
some claim about the holder’s identity is valid or not. Allen gives the example of certificate
authorities (CAs). CAs are responsible for handing out certificates to internet sites. Users
trust the CAs to hand out only valid certificates. One big problem with centralized authori-
ties is that users are bound to that one authority, and this authority can deny users identity
or confirm a false identity. Consequently, this central authority has all the power.
The second phase, federated identity, was established around the year 2000. Microsoft’s
Passport initiative enabled users to use the same identity to authenticate and authorize on
different sites. Also, companies or institutions frequently use Single Sign-On (SSO) mod-
ules. With SSO, users do not need to log in again when wanting to access another system
within the same organization or domain. The problem, however, is still that a central au-
thority manages the identity of the user.
In the third phase, user-centric identity, as the term suggests, the idea is to make the
users the central actor in the identity process, as already introduced in the introduction.
Allen claims that powerful companies made it difficult for researchers and implementers
to achieve that goal. And what’s left is the idea that a user only authenticates to a credential
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provider, and this provider manages all identities of the user; Facebooks popular Connect
service is an example.
In phase number four, self-sovereign identity (SSI), the centralized nature of the previ-
ous stages shall diminish. Users shall completely own their data by storing it locally on, for
instance, a mobile device. Then, users can decide which parties get access to parts of their
identity.
Figure 3.2: SSI actors (inspired by Mühle et al. [27])
Mühle et al. [27] identify the relation between the different actors in an SSI system, as
depicted in figure 3.2. As previously mentioned, an issuer issues signed claims to users. A
lot of current SSI software systems provide wallet applications to users, which typically are
installed on mobile phones to let users store their claims locally. Any relying party, a so-
called verifier, requests specific attributes from the user based on authorization policies for
the service it offers. Then, the user discloses those attributes after approving the request.
On the trust relation, we elaborate further in subsection 3.1.3.
We want to note that the definition of SSI is still under discussion within the industry
and research community. Recent research show that the term user-centric is still used, for
instance in [21] or [42]. Hence, in what follows, we choose to use user-centric, because, as
the name already suggests, the user stays central.
3.1.2. CREDENTIALS
The fundament of any user-centric system are credentials. A credential is a cryptographic
container, containing a set of claims of a subject. An issuer cryptographically signs the
claims by attaching a signature to the credential. The signature provides relying parties
confidence about the validity of the claims made. Commonly, credentials also contain
metadata, such as who the actual issuer is, and the validity period of the credential. Chaum [9]
extends the concept with the addition of anonymous credentials. By utilizing pseudonyms,
individuals can make sure that when disclosing a credential, that the individual is “anony-
mous”. This makes it harder for other parties or attackers to identify the individual when
only looking at the content of a credential. This concept is also referred to as unlinkability.
Pfitzmann et al. [33] define unlinkability as an attacker is not sufficiently able to distinguish
if messages can be linked to each other to identify the user who sends those messages.
Users can increase unlinkability by using different pseudonyms for each transaction. A
pseudonym is an identifier, which does not reveal the real identity of an individual.
According to Alpar and Jacobs [3], in recent years, the notion of anonymous creden-
tials is renamed to attribute-based credentials (ABCs). One of the optional features of an
ABC is that several attributes can be shown independently of one another. A technique to
realize this feature is called Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP), described first by Golderwasser
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et al. [18]. With ZKPs, someone (a prover) can convince someone else (a verifier) that she
knows a secret without revealing the secret itself. For example, imagine, a club wants that
only people older than 18 years, can enter. With ZKP, the prover only needs to reveal to
the bouncer the fact that she is older than 18 years old, without having to reveal her ac-
tual birth date, or any other information that is on her ID.1 Hence, the concept of ZKP is
privacy-enhancing. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [8] developed a digital signature scheme
to enable implementers to employ ZKPs in software systems. The scheme became part of
IBM’s Idemix specification [46].
3.1.3. TRUST RELATIONSHIPS
In figure 3.2, one specific trust relationship exists; in particular, the verifier needs to trust
the issuer that the issuer issued valid credentials to the user. Otherwise, a verifier can not
trust any credentials disclosed by a user. In the end, this is a social problem and still subject
to academic research. However, in the architecture document of ABC4Trust by Bichsel et.
al [6], the authors try to list all the trust relationships typically needed in an ABC-system.
All parties involved need to trust each other sufficiently to make a user-centric IMS work.
In the following, we list only relationships relevant for our research; that are relationships
between users, issuers, and verifiers.
• All parties involved have certain trust assumptions in common. First, they need to
put trust in the correctness of the underlying cryptographic protocols. Second, into
the trustworthiness of the implemented software system.
• From a user’s perspective, the user trusts the issuer that it delivers correct credentials.
Also, issuers design credentials in such a way to avoid the introduction of privacy
risks. And that issuers do not block the use of credentials without a valid reason.
• Users need to trust verifiers that they do not misbehave, by, for example, trying to
create a dossier of the user. However, institutions can enforce regulations to make
this harder for verifiers.
• As stated above, verifiers need to trust issuers to issue only valid and correct creden-
tials.
• Also, verifiers need to trust users not to share credentials with others if this is not
permitted. Possibly, the sharing of credentials can even be made impossible due to
the chosen technology.
3.1.4. BLOCKCHAIN AND DID
For registering identifiers and related information, according to Mühle et al. [27], a blockchain
plays a crucial role in the architecture of an SSI system, thereby replacing the registration
authority as known in centralized identity management systems. Satoshi Nakamoto [28]
invented the blockchain technology. It is the underlying technology used by the crypto-
currency Bitcoin. A blockchain is a chain of blocks. More specifically, it is an expanding list
of records linked together by using specific cryptography. The cryptography makes it hard
for attackers to modify content stored on a blockchain. Usually, a peer-to-peer network
1Quisquater et al. [34] explain ZKP in a more extensive example
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manages a blockchain. Each peer needs to follow a specific protocol to add a block. This
concept, according to Christidis and Devetsikiotis [11], enables trustless networks. Trust-
less means that parties can trust the integrity of the data of others even though they do not
trust other parties.
According to the W3C, it is impossible to establish a complete decentral identity sys-
tem with traditional centralized authorities, as each of those authorities serves as its root of
trust. Hence, the W3C is currently developing a specification, called Decentralized Identi-
fiers (DID), standardizing the usage of decentralized digital identities.2 While DIDs do not
require blockchain technology, they are often associated with it nowadays. We can think
of a DID infrastructure as a globally available key-value database. The key is the DID itself,
which is a string consisting of several parts. The value refers to a DID document, which a
blockchain usually stores. A DID document contains identifying information about a party,
e.g., a public key required in cryptographic protocols. Then, any relying party can use this
publicly available information.
All in all, DIDs based on blockchain technology can play an essential role in truly de-
centralizing identity management.
3.1.5. USER-CENTRIC IMS PROJECTS
In the following two subsections, we introduce three recent user-centric IMS projects, in
particular Sovrin, uPort, and Verifiable Credentials Ltd.
Sovrin The Sovrin Foundation is a private-sector, non-profit organization that established
the Sovrin project. The project aims to provide a solution based on SSI principles. They
claim that they employ the first public permissioned blockchain, which differentiates it
from other SSI systems.3 Permissioned blockchains can run at much higher throughput
than permissionless blockchains, while still achieving a high level of trust. With permis-
sionless blockchains, every user can add entries to the blockchain. With permissioned
blockchains, only users with permission can add entries. Consequently, within Sovrin, the
Board of Trustees ultimately governs Sovrin, which approves the policies to select stewards.
Stewards are trusted institutions that operate the nodes of the blockchain.
The software stack of Sovrin consists of three layers: the blockchain, agents, and clients.
Anyone can develop agents and clients, and hence are open for the competitive market.
Both agents and clients act as a client to the blockchain. The difference between an agent
and a client is that the agent operates via a P2P network layered over the blockchain. Hence
the agent is also acting as a server, addressable via a network endpoint.
uPort uPort is a platform for SSI, built on the Ethereum blockchain. It consists of three
main components: smart contracts, developer libraries, and a mobile app. Christidis and
Devetsikiotis explain in [11] that smart contracts in the context of a blockchain are scripts
stored on the blockchain. They are only executed by addressing a transaction towards it.
uPort developed a smart contract architecture that enables uPort to attach attributes to
identifiers and selectively disclose attributes. The mobile app holds the user’s claims, and
consequently, it is possible to disclose those claims to other SPs. The developer libraries
2See the DID specification here: https://w3c.github.io/did-core/
3The official whitepaper about Sovrin: https://sovrin.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/The-
Technical-Foundations-of-Sovrin.pdf.
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enable third-party app developers to integrate uPort support in their apps. After the first
implementation, the project integrated the DID and VC standard based on JSON Web To-
kens.4. Interestingly, uPort provides libraries for an HTTPS DID method. It means that it
stores the DID document not on a blockchain, but under a web-resource reachable via the
HTTP protocol. Consequently, by applying the HTTPS method, a DID has the following
format: “did:https:example.com”. However, a centralized authority needs to host the DID
documents, thereby undermining the feature of trustless networks.
Verifiable Credentials Ltd David Chadwick is CEO of the company “Verifiable Creden-
tials Ltd”, which he established in 2019. He is an expert in the IdM field and is co-author of
the VC standard. He claims that by combining the VC and “Web Authentication protocol”
standard, they create a secure and privacy-preserving IMS infrastructure. The “Web Au-
thentication protocol” defines an API to enable the creation and sharing of credentials by
applications to authenticate users.5 Contrary to the other two projects, they do not make
use of blockchain technology.
3.2. LINKED DATA
The VC specification refers extensively to the concept of Linked Data. Therefore, we explain
it here in more detail, together with related ideas. Everybody familiar with the web knows
how to browse from one website to another by using hyperlinks; websites are just docu-
ments made for humans to consume. Also, humans can understand the meaning of text.
The underlying question is how we can enable computer systems to find, link, and under-
stand data semantically. This is where Linked Data comes in as it provides a set of principles
for generating semantic data. Tim-Berners Lee, the founder of the world-wide-web, was
one of the first persons talking about the notion of linked data and introducing those princi-
ples listed under https://www.w3.org/DesignIssues/LinkedData.html. He stated that
“the Semantic Web isn’t just about putting data on the web. It is about making links so that
a person or machine can explore the web of data. With linked data, when you have some of
it, you can find other, related, data”.
A standard format used for linked data is RDF, the Resource Description Framework.6
The core structure of the abstract syntax is a set of triples. Each triple called an RDF graph
consists of a subject, a predicate, and an object. For computer systems, it is essential to
have an ontology for predicates to “understand” the relationship between a subject and an
object. Ezike [15] introduced such an ontology, downloadable under http://dig.csail.
mit.edu/2018/svc, which he developed for SolidVC.
JSON-LD [48] is a JSON-based format to serialize linked data with multiple intentions.
First, to build interoperable web services. Second, to store linked data in JSON-based stor-
age engines. Third, use linked data in programming environments.7 One goal of JSON-LD
is to require as little effort as possible from developers to transform their existing JSON to
4See also uPort Credentials - create verification example: https://developer.uport.me/credentials/
createverification
5See https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/
6See https://www.w3.org/TR/rdf11-concepts/ for concepts and abstract syntax
7Google announced in 2015 that it recognizes JSON-LD as a structured data type to have the ability to
understand better the content of the data it parses for their search engine. See https://webmasters.
googleblog.com/2015/03/easier-website-development-with-web.html for more information.
14 3. PRELIMINARY
JSON-LD.8 In figure 1 we use an example of a valid JSON-LD message that describes a Per-
son.9 The @context is http://www.schema.org, resulting in that all keys and @type values
are defined under http://www.schema.org, for example alternateName can be looked up via
https://schema.org/alternateName.jsonld.
To sum up, linked data and the underlying principles enable computer systems to query
and understand data on a semantic level. With JSON-LD, a JSON-based format was devel-
oped supporting linked data.





5 "name": "Jay Holtslander",
6 "alternateName": "Jason Holtslander",
7 "nationality": "Canadian",











19 "disambiguatingDescription": "Co-founder of CodeCore Bootcamp",
20 "jobTitle": "Technical Director"
21 }
3.3. INTEROPERABILITY
Within ISO/IEC 2382-01, interoperability is defined as follows: “The capability to commu-
nicate, execute programs, or transfer data among various functional units in a manner
that requires the user to have little or no knowledge of the unique characteristics of those
units.”10 Phones are a good example of successful interoperability. No matter which com-
pany produced the phone, and no matter which company set up and maintains the cellular
8See design goals of JSON-LD: https://json-ld.org/spec/latest/json-ld/#design-goals-and-
rationale
9Partly copied from https://github.com/JayHoltslander/Structured-Data-JSON-LD/blob/
master/Person.json
10The PDF version is available via archive.org: https://web.archive.org/web/20071129034634/http:
//old.jtc1sc36.org/doc/36N0646.pdf
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network, and no matter if the call is placed wirelessly or via landline, from any phone, you
can call any other phone.
There are several benefits of interoperability, and we describe two important in what
follows. First, according to Choi and Whinston [10], it plays an essential role in lowering
costs and prices in the economy. It plays an even more crucial role in our digital economy
as we already use there different interoperable parts, such as in hardware or the world wide
web. In contrast, according to research from the NIST [17], inadequate interoperability in
the US capital facilities industry leads to costs of around 15.8 billion dollars annually. Sec-
ond, Opara-Martins and Feng Tian [29] argue that interoperability helps to tackle the prob-
lem of vendor lock-in. Vendor lock-in means that once a company switched to a particular
vendor, it is difficult to change to another vendor due to the use of proprietary software.
In particular, organizations fear the movement to a cloud-computing-based infrastructure
due to the risk of vendor lock-in.
Organizations can reach a certain degree of interoperability by defining and providing
standards for IT systems, thereby increasing the capability of interoperation between sys-
tems. However, as Lewis et al. [23] state, expectations of what can be achieved by a standard
are often unrealistic. In particular, expectations are that after systems comply with specific
standards, that it guarantees seamless interoperability. But it does not take into account
organizational and cultural context. Hence, organizations need to be aware of such limita-
tions.
According to Brownsword et al. [7], achieving and maintaining interoperability between
systems is difficult due to several reasons. First, it is difficult due to the complexity of the
systems and their potential interactions with other systems. Then, the lack of conformity
between participating organizations. The third reason is the evolvement of the systems
itself. And finally, due to the lack of visibility of all the details within and between the inter-
operating systems. Hence, it can be useful to have some model or framework available that
enables us to categorize or measure the level of interoperability. Consequently, it might
enable us to reason how to increase the capability of interoperation.
Tolk and Muguira [37], amongst others, developed a model called “the Levels of Con-
ceptual Interoperability” (LCIM). The need for this model emerged as, according to Tolk
and Muguira existing models were not sufficient, and “establishment of metadata stan-
dards allows a much more open use of data within the systems, as not the data itself has
to be standardized, but the interpretation of the data in the given context”. The model was
revised several times until the community agreed upon a version with seven hierarchical
levels [38], see figure 3.3.
Each new level in the model is targeting a different perspective for the exchange of
data. In level zero, systems are not interoperable. On the first level, technical interoper-
ability unambiguously protocols for communication exists used by infrastructure. In level
two, syntactic interoperability, a standard structure to exchange information exists. In level
three, semantic interoperability, systems share the meaning of data. On the fourth level,
pragmatic interoperability, systems know each other’s methods and procedures, hence the
context is understood. In level five, dynamic interoperability, after exchanging data, the
effects of processing the information is understood by participating systems. On the last
level, conceptual interoperability, all involved concepts need to be fully documented and
publicly available in a way that other engineers can understand them; and the model needs
to be implementation independent.
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Figure 3.3: LCIM levels (copy from Wang et al. [38])
To conclude, interoperability is a characteristic of a system to make it easier to exchange
information with other systems. Interoperability has several advantages, such as lowering
costs or tackling the issue of vendor lock-in. Standards can help to make systems more in-
teroperable. However, often expectations of standards are too high. Additionally, several
reasons make it difficult to achieve and maintain interoperability. Researchers provide us
with models such as LCIM to measure the capability of interoperation. It facilitates discus-
sions between parties on how to increase this capability.
4
IRMA, VC AND THEIR RELATION
In this chapter, we introduce the two topics that are part of the title of this thesis in greater
detail, “IRMA” and “Verifiable Credential”. In section 4.1, we outline the history of the IRMA
project and what its mission is. Then, we define the roles, architecture, data model, and
concepts. In section 4.2, we elaborate on the motivation and goals of the VC working group,
and the use-cases they foresee. Also, we zoom into the VC specification, describing the
roles available, data model, and related concepts. At the end of this chapter, we compare
and contrast the two concepts to identify similarities and differences.
We obtain technical documentation of IRMA from the official documentation: https:
//irma.app/docs/.
The VC data model is obtainable via https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/.
4.1. IRMA
In 2016 the Digital Security research group of the Radboud University and the Privacy and
Identity Lab founded the Privacy by Design Foundation (PbDF). The mission of the foun-
dation is to promote the development use of open, secure, and privacy-friendly technolo-
gies. They established the IRMA project. Within IRMA, the mobile app stays central. By
using the app, the user has full control of her identity. Credentials are only stored locally
on the user’s phone, and no one but them has access to it. In every disclosing session, a
user authenticates with another pseudonym. This results in the unlinkability of messages
and, consequently, makes it harder for parties to identify individuals. However, in many
use-cases, individuals use personal identifying attributes such as the BSN or email address.
Those attributes make individuals identifiable.
If we look at the four different categories in which we can classify IdM, we can argue
that IRMA falls into three of those categories. Authentication and authorization, as orga-
nizations can employ IRMA to let users gain access to a resource by checking disclosed
attributes against policies. And also, user management, as issuers calculate the validity pe-
riod of credentials, and users have control of which attributes they store about themselves
within the IRMA app.
4.1.1. USE-CASES
In the following list some of the use-cases are described briefly that the IRMA project cur-
rently realizes:
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• The IRMA organization helps to realize age verification in liquor stores in the city of
Almere.1
• nuts.nl is a consortium consisting of several e-health companies. The consortium
tries to join forces to set up an open standard for identifying and authenticating indi-
viduals with the help of IRMA.
• Also, IRMA sees itself as a technology that can help against fake news and deepfakes
by using digital signatures according to Jacobs.2
4.1.2. ROLES
The following roles participate in the IRMA ecosystem:
User The user using the IRMA app, acts as the client in the IRMA protocol;
Verifier or service provider A party offering a service to users, and usually wants to verify
a user’s attributes for identifying purposes;
Identity provider or issuer A party wanting to issue attributes to a user;
Issuer Issues credentials to a client when instructed by an identity provider using its pri-
vate key;
Requestor A party that either wants to verify a users attributes or issues attributes to a
user;
Scheme manager Maintaining one or more schemes. Via scheme distributing issuer in-
formation, such as public keys, and credential types. Decides which issuers may join
a scheme.
4.1.3. ARCHITECTURE
Figure 4.1: IRMA credential (inspired by Alpar and Jacobs [3])
In figure 4.1 we see an IRMA credential. It contains the attributes of the user, the issuer’s
signature, the metadata attribute, and the user’s secret key. The first attribute of any IRMA
credential is always the user’s secret key. The IRMA-app generates the secret key when it
runs for the first time. However, IRMA never discloses the key. Still, the key is of relevance in
the cryptographic protocol. It proves that the credentials belong to the same user if the user
disclosed attributes from multiple credentials. The issuer’s signature is essential within any
user-centric system. It signs the attributes proving that those attributes are indeed from
1See a tweet from the IRMA project: https://twitter.com/IRMA_privacy/status/
1111384252761796608.
2See the IRMA Manifest by Jacobs: https://privacybydesign.foundation/pdf/IRMA-manifest-2019.
pdf, in Dutch.
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that issuer and valid. The metadata attribute contains information about which creden-
tial type this credential is an instance of, the issuing date of the credential, and the expiry
date of the credential. The credential type determines which issuer signs the credential,
its validity period, and names of the contained attributes.3 Credential types and other in-
formation are stored within a scheme. IRMA uses centrally maintained schemes, whereby
the schemes are updated periodically by the different components, to tell all parties which
credential types are valid, and which issuer may issue them
IRMAs cryptographic protocol is partly implementing IBM’s Idemix specification. In
particular, IRMA uses ZKPs for two reasons. First, to hide attributes in a credential that a
user does not want to disclose, referred to as “selective disclosure”. Second, to prove knowl-
edge of the secret key to the issuer without actually disclosing it.4
A public-private-key-pair is needed to enable a verifier to verify a user’s credentials. The
private key is used by the issuer to sign a credential. The public key is used by a verifier to
verify that the disclosed attributes are signed using the corresponding private key.
In IRMA, three distinct session types exist. First, in an issuance session, the user wants
to obtain claims from an issuer to be loaded in the IRMA app. Subsequently, users can use
those claims in the other session types. Second, in a disclosure session, a verifier asks the
user to disclose attributes. It depends on the use-case what kind of attributes, and the user
needs to confirm the disclosure. Third, similar to a disclosure session, in a signing session,
the attributes are attached to a message. However, in this research, signing sessions are
left-out-of-scope as it is a variant of a disclosing session. In appendix B we describe the
issuance and disclosure processes of IRMA in detail.
Figure 4.2: IRMA system overview
In figure 4.2, we show how the different components in an issuance and disclosure ses-
3See for an example https://github.com/privacybydesign/pbdf-schememanager/blob/master/
pbdf/Issues/irmatube/description.xml.
4More information about how IRMA implements ZKP, see https://irma.app/docs/zkp/.
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sion interact with each other. The user needs to use the IRMA app to receive and store at-
tributes and, subsequently, use them in a disclosing session. IRMA uses the keyshare server
to verify the PIN, and in the keyshare protocol. The issuer or verifier embeds the “irmajs”
library into its website to provide the user with the QR code. Initially, the party in the role
of requestor needs to create a session via the /session endpoint on the IRMA server. Based
on the session information, the website computes the QR code. After the user scans the
QR code or using a deep-link to open the IRMA app, the connection between the app and
the IRMA server is established. Then, the app uses /irma endpoint to exchange messages
with the IRMA server. In an issuance session, the issuer needs to employ a central user
repository, where the attributes of a user are stored to be able to pass the correct attributes
to the authenticated user. In a disclosing session, the verifier needs to check the disclosed
attributes against its access control policies to either grant or deny the user access to the
desired resource. Periodically, the servers and the mobile app update the used schemes by
contacting the scheme manager, who maintains the scheme.
In the following paragraphs, we explain the different components in more detail.
irma_mobile Users need to install the IRMA app on her mobile device, which users can
download from the official Android and iOS app stores. irma_mobile depends on irmago
as the business logic is handled entirely within irmago. By implementing the data model
and supporting code within irmago, the IRMA project only needs to maintain those in one
central place.
irma_keyshare_server The keyshare server has multiple responsibilities. First, it can val-
idate the PIN entered by the user. Only then, the KSS allows the session to continue. Sec-
ond, it can block a user for a certain amount of time if the user enters the PIN wrong too
many times. Fourth, for users, it is also possible to block their account via the KSS website.
One disadvantage of the KSS is that if it is not available, no one using the scheme linked to
the KSS can use that scheme’s credentials anymore. Within an IRMA scheme, the use of the
keyshare server can be enabled or disabled.
irmago Irmago is an IRMA implementation in Golang. It contains the data model, busi-
ness logic to handle requests, generate, and store credentials. Also, it provides the command-
line tool irma, which amongst others, can start an IRMA server instance. When running an
IRMA server, two endpoints are exposed: /irma, that is used by the IRMA app during IRMA
sessions. And /sessions, that is used by requestors, enabling them to initiate a session, mon-
itor them, and retrieve session results.
irmajs The irmajs component is essentially a JavaScript client that consumes the RESTful
JSON API from the irmago component. When interacting with either the issuer or verifier,
the user browses to a website from that party. Then, the irmajs component requests the
session from the IRMA server. Subsequently, it generates the QR-code or deep-link to com-
municate the session to the client. Consequently, the client can directly communicate with
the IRMA server via the /irma endpoint.
pbdf-schememanager The responsibility of the scheme manager is to maintain the in-
formation of one ore more IRMA schemes and distribute it to relevant parties. Anyone
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Figure 4.3: IRMA scheme structure (copy from https://irma.app/docs/schemes/)
can start a new scheme, and consequently, become the scheme manager for that scheme.
The PbDF maintains its scheme called “pbdf-schememanager”, which the IRMA app uses
by default. The “pbdf-schememanager” scheme is hosted on GitHub. 5 Organizations can
configure the app and IRMA servers to use different schemes.
A scheme contains essential information such as which parties issue credentials, their
public keys, and which credential types to use. From a trust angle, this means that there
is always a central party. The party is responsible for maintaining the scheme, for in-
stance, to update issuer information or to add new credential types. Also, scheme man-
agers often delegate the hosting to a third party, for instance, GitHub, in case of the “pbdf-
schememanager”.
Each scheme is signed within IRMA. In the file index IRMA stores all hashes of all files
within a scheme. Then, IRMA stores a signature of the index file in index.sig. This enables
any party to verify that no one tampered with the scheme.
A scheme is set up as a directory structure, as visible in figure 4.3. Within a scheme,
each issuer gets a directory (IssuerName). Within the “Issues” subdirectory, the scheme
contains credential types that the issuer can issue; listing 2 shows partly the official Face-
book type belonging to issuer “pbdf”. As a consequence, it means that issuers can not share
types, and one issuer owns at least one credential type. Within the “PublicKeys” subdirec-
tory, the public keys are stored, which the verifier uses in a disclosing session to verify that
the disclosed credential is valid. As certificates expire, issuers need to renew their certifi-
cates periodically. A new public key does not overwrite the old one. This enables users to
disclose credentials signed with an expired certificate. Within irmago, a so-called “public
key counter” is used to refer to the different public keys of an issuer.
5See https://github.com/privacybydesign/pbdf-schememanager
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28 <Attribute id="dateofbirth" optional="true">
29 <Name>






Based on the client and storage package within irmago we can visualize the relationships
between the entities of the data model as shown in figure 4.4. The client object references
different CredentialTypeIdentifiers depending on which credentials the user retrieved from
an issuer. Each CredentialTypeIdentifier refers to a credential. A credential includes one
AttributeList which contains one or more attributes. Each attribute has a key-value pair
organized via a map. The key is an instance of AttributeTypeIdentifier, and the value is
an instance of a TranslatedString. The TranslatedString contains the actual rawValue, the
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Figure 4.4: IRMA data model
English value, and the Dutch value of the attribute. In addition, each credential refers to one
gabi.Credential. It holds the gabi.CLSignature which represents the signature received from
the issuer. IRMA stores the actual relevant integer values of the signature in the variables
A, E, and V. Also, as said earlier, each credential contains relevant metadata. Subsequently,
the metadata is an attribute on its own via the MetadataAttribute. It contains the credential
type, signing date, validity via the expirationDate, and the public key counter.
SECURITY PROPERTIES
IRMA guarantees several security properties due to the chosen architecture, protocols and
technologies:6
Credential unforgeability Only the issuer, which holds the Idemix private key, can issue
credentials. Hence, a verifier may assume safely they were issued by that issuer.
Multi-show unlinkability A verifier cannot tell if the same user performed two IRMA ses-
sions or not, even if the user discloses the same set of attributes twice.
Issuer unlinkability An issuer of attributes cannot trace disclosures of attributes to iden-
tify a user, even if the issuer is also the verifier.
Grouping credentials using the private key The IRMA app can prove that different cre-
dentials share the same secret key. Subsequently, the attributes must come from the
same user.
Eavesdroppers cannot perform replay attacks A verifier can detect if a nonce is used more
than once and can reject the request. The verifier sends in each session the so-called
nonce to the IRMA app, and the IRMA app uses this nonce in a certain fashion,
Verifiers cannot perform replay attacks The IRMA app never sends a complete copy of
the credential’s signature to the verifier as the app hides parts of it using ZKP. Conse-
quently, verifiers are not able to reuse the credential to disclose them to other veri-
fiers.
6See also https://irma.app/docs/overview/#irma-security-properties
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No impersonation attacks Due to its decentral nature, the IRMA architecture guarantees
that no other party than the user and the requestor are involved when exchanging
the contents of credentials.
No privacy hotspots The user sends attributes directly to the verifier without passing through
a central party.
Selective disclosure Users have full control of which attribute they disclose.
4.2. VERIFIABLE CREDENTIALS
In 2017 the W3C established a working group, which was tasked to develop a data model
and syntax for the expression of verifiable credentials.7 Out-of-scope was defining an at-
tribute exchange protocol and browser APIs. The working group states that “there is cur-
rently no widely used self-sovereign and privacy-enhancing standard for expressing and
transacting verifiable claims (aka credentials, attestations) via the Web”. A digital verifiable
credential is more tamper-evident due to the use of technology than, for instance, a physi-
cal passport. The employed technology shall make it easier and more secure to express and
exchange credentials.
Initially, the working group identified three distinct problems. First, there is no standard
available for users to prove claims to a verifying party, resulting in error-prone manual in-
put and also fraud on the web. Second, users and their claims do not independently exist
from service providers, which leads amongst others to vendor lock-in and reduced privacy
for all stakeholders; Third, only industry-specific solutions are available and no interoper-
able standard of expressing credentials.
Based on these problems, the working group identified three main goals it tries to achieve:8 9
• Create a standard way that users can assess their credentials to a service provider,
which consequently can lower fraud on the internet;
• Ensure that users and their associated claims can be independent of service providers
to enable users to change their SP, which prevents vendor lock-in;
• Ensure that there is an interoperable standard for expressing verifiable credentials,
leading to that users can manage their digital identities uniformly.
The main objective of the VC standard is to provide implementers with an unambigu-
ous specification that supports them in building interoperable user-centric and privacy-
friendly identity systems.
The data model document [47] is structured in different sections. In the introduction,
the reader gets general information about VC and what its use-cases are. Then, in the core
data model section, the crucial concepts are described. In particular, claim, credential, and
presentation, which we introduce in more detail in later subsections. In the fourth and fifth
sections, the document lists concepts, whereby some are normative, and others are non-
normative. Normative means that those parts are describing how to comply with the stan-
dard, whereby it does not define whether the part is a MUST-have or only RECOMMENDED
7See https://www.w3.org/2017/vc/charter.html for more details
8See the VC working group FAQ: https://w3c.github.io/webpayments-ig/VCTF/charter/faq.html
9A surveyhttps://w3c.github.io/webpayments-ig/VCTF/support among 91 organizations shows that
out of the 56 organizations participating 93 % of them support the problem statement and 96 % support the
goals and that those were reasonable goals to pursue.
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to implement.10 Non-normative, or also called informative, supports the conceptual un-
derstanding. In the next section, syntax, the authors explain how the data model is realized
with JSON or JSON-LD. We leave the following sections out-of-scope for this thesis.
4.2.1. USE-CASES
The working group identified several problem domains where VCs can be applied, listed on
https://w3c.github.io/vc-use-cases/. We picked per domain one example to give
the reader an idea which implementations are imaginable:
Finance With VCs, a user can prove parts of her identity relevant for a money transfer or
even opening a new bank account via the internet.
Education A system can identify students for online classes via an ’I am a student at uni-
versity x’-claim.
Healthcare A doctor could use his doctors’ certificate to write prescriptions, which im-
proved accountability and verifiability.
Retail A retail company could request address-attributes from customers to verify their
address.
Professional A system can use certificates to prove that one can give certain training. With
an expiry date added to the certificate, participants can ensure that the person giving
the training is still officially qualified.
Legal identity Long lines due to airport security checks could be avoided in the future if
VCs are employed to verify a person’s legal identity.
4.2.2. ROLES
In the following, we describe several roles participating in the VC ecosystem:
Holder Receives credentials from an issuer and usually stores credentials in some kind of
repository;
Issuer Issues credentials to holders;
Subject Usually having one or more VCs asserted about it, and in most cases, the holder is
also the subject, but it is not always the case, e.g., a mother could hold the VCs of her
child;
Verifier Requests claims from holders to authenticate them;
Verifiable Data Registry Mediate creation and verification of identifiers, keys, VC schemas,
and revocation registries.
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Figure 4.5: VC architecture (copy from https://w3c-ccg.github.io/vc-lifecycle/)
4.2.3. ARCHITECTURE
In figure 4.5, the interactions between the different roles of a basic verifiable credential sys-
tem are depicted. Initially, the issuer issues credentials to the holder’s agent (e.g., a smart-
phone) before a holder can present attributes to any verifier. To store the credentials, the
holder puts them into a repository owned by herself, which gives the holder full control of
her credentials. The holder can ask her agent to compute and send a verifiable presenta-
tion to the verifier to present credentials. VC systems may use a verifiable data registry, or
previously called identifier registry, to create and verify identifiers, schemes, issuer pub-
lic keys, and any other relevant data needed to run sessions within a VC ecosystem. The
verifiable data registry can either be centralized, for instance, a centralized database, or
decentralized, for instance, a blockchain.
In the next sections, we introduce essential concepts of the VC data model, in particular
claims, credentials, presentations, and extensibility.
CLAIM
A claim (or attribute) is a statement about a subject, e.g., a person is older than 18 years. A
subject does not necessarily need to be a human being but can be any other entity about
which claims can be made. Claims are expressed by using subject-property-value relation-
ships, referred to as graphs, as shown in figure 4.6. “Mr. Pat” (subject) is an alumni of
(property) “Open Universiteit” (value). As described in secion 3.2 implementers can make
use of JSON-LD to model those kinds of relationships and more complex ones.
Figure 4.6: Claim example
10Inspired by Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normative#Standards_documents
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CREDENTIAL
According to the specification, “a verifiable credential (VC) is a tamper-evident credential
that has authorship that can be cryptographically verified”. “Tamper-evident” means that
for parties, it shall be easy to gather evidence if tampering has occurred within a creden-
tial. “Cryptographically verified” means that a software system can verify the contents of
a VC cryptographically without human interaction. A VC can contain claims about differ-
ent subjects. However, for the sake of simplicity, we state that a holder of a VC is also the
subject.
Figure 4.7: Verifiable Credential data model
Since we express the concepts of a VC in subject-property-value relationships, we can
easily translate this into an Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD). In figure 4.7, we show that
a verifiable credential consists of several required entities. The @context property tells sys-
tems which terminology both systems must understand to be able to communicate with
each other. Each credential contains credential metadata, in particular, which issuer issued
the credential, when it was issued, and optionally, an expiration date. A type determines if
a VC (or verifiable presentation) is appropriate in the current situation. For example, if
a holder expects a UniversityDegreeCredential type, but receives a HigeschoolDegreeCre-
dential, it can reject the received credential and inform the issuer about it. The VC specifi-
cation supports mechanisms to have other parties dereference the type property. That can
result in machine-readable information about the type. A credential has at least one claim
included about a subject, which a VC expresses via the credentialSubject property. The cre-
dentialSchema property is used in two different ways, either for data verification purposes
for verifying that a VC conforms to a published schema or for data encoding purposes for
mapping the contents of a VC to another representation format, such as ZKP. Also, the cre-
dential contains one or more proof objects depending on the proof mechanism utilized. A
proof in a credential is a signature generated by the issuer to verify the authorship of the
credential.
PRESENTATION
When identifying oneself, a person usually only wants to show the claims of herself that she
needs for the intended purpose. The expression of a subset of a person’s claims to a verify-
ing party is called a verifiable presentation. As depicted in fig 4.8 a verifiable presentation
consists of several elements. The most significant difference with a VC is that a presenta-
tion contains derived verifiable credentials. A derived VC is a VC generated from an earlier
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Figure 4.8: Verifiable Presentation data model
received VC from an issuer. The derived VC may contain only a subset of claims needed by
the use-case. For instance, by utilizing ZKP, users can selectively disclose claims. The VC
specification explicitly supports the use of Zero-Knowledge Proofs. Two other concepts are
needed to implement ZKP within a verifiable presentation. First, each derived credential
needs to contain a credential definition via the “credentialSchema” property to perform
cryptographic operations. And second, the verifier uses the “proof” property to check that
all derived credentials come from the same user.
Figure 4.9 shows a visual example of the relationship between VCs and the derived cre-
dentials in a ZKP presentation. Only some of the claims of the original VCs are part of the
final presentation via selective disclosure. In this example, each derived credentials con-
tain a proof property to prove the “knowledge of signature”. In the presentation, the proof
property contains the “common link secret”, which proves that the credentials are all from
the same holder.
EXTENSIBILITY
Another goal of the data model is to enable permissionless innovation. Permissionless in-
novation has its roots in the discussion if the web must remain open. For instance, Cerf [45]
argues in favor of it, one of the fathers of the internet. Permissionless means that everyone
shall be able to innovate without the need for prior approval. To enable everyone to inno-
vate within the scope of the specification, the data model implements several mechanisms
to make it extensible.
First, through the use of a graph-based data model, it becomes possible to model com-
plex relationships. For instance, a subject retrieves a driving license credential, which we
visualize in figure 4.10 Within the credentialSubject, the driving school where the subject
took his driving lessons is added as an object. The driving school has a contact person who
we add as a person object. Also, the driving school chooses the instructor, who we also add
as a person object.
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Figure 4.9: ZKP presentation (copy from VC data model [47])
Figure 4.10: Driving license graph example
Second, through the support of multiple types of proof formats. The working group felt
the need to document two proof formats in the VC data model, in particular JSON Web To-
ken, and Linked Data Proofs. However, other systems, such as IRMA, can employ different
ones.
Third, extend the machine-readable vocabulary to describe information by using linked
data without the need for a centralized system. In theory, any system shall be able to add
new types dynamically in a decentralized manner. The data model describes an example
by adding a corporate reference number and favorite food to a subject.
However, the more extensible a software becomes, the more complex the software can
become. Hence implementers need to weigh how flexible their system should or even can
be, for instance, due to legal obligations.
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4.3. COMPARE AND CONTRAST
The goal of this research is to explore the relation between the concepts of IRMA and VC.
Hence we compare and contrast the two based on goals and concepts. As visible in venn
diagram 4.11, we can identify specific similarities and differences. In the following para-
graphs, we elaborate on each of those in more detail. First, we describe the differences, and
afterward, the similarities. At last, based on the findings, we provide a conclusion.
Figure 4.11: Goals and concepts in IRMA and VC
IRMA is a practical and user-centric IMS, providing us with components for the front-
end (irmajs and the IRMA app) and backend (irmago). In contrast, the VC standard does
not provide us with a software system but a specification. However, the user-centric iden-
tity model plays a crucial role in the specification.
One goal of the VC standard is to extend interoperability of user-centric identity sys-
tems. For users, one benefit is that they can more easily transfer credentials from one sys-
tem to another, thereby preventing vendor lock-in. Also, users might be able to receive
credentials from other systems and disclose credentials across systems. The IRMA project
focuses on promoting and improving its system. In the following chapters, we focus exten-
sively on how to adapt IRMA to extend its interoperability.
IRMA implements a custom protocol, as described in appendix B. On the other hand,
the VC standard does not provide us with a protocol. However, the VC working group pro-
duced an unambiguous specification providing us with a data model, related concepts,
and syntax. Therefore, we take the data model of IRMA and enrich the entities with the
name of entities of the VC data model via red text next to the IRMA entities, as visible in
figure 4.12. Within IRMA, each credential is uniquely identifiable via the CredentialType-
Identifier. Subsequently, we can use this identifier to extend the type property of a VC.
IRMA’s publicKeyCounter and credentialType are both needed when resolving issuer infor-
mation. The CLSignature within IRMA provides us with proof information. Within the cur-
rent IRMA data model, a credential holder is always the subject of the credential, and hence
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one credential contains one and only one subject. Therefore, we can link the AttributeList
within IRMA to the credentialSubject property of VC. Each AttributeTypeIdentifier within an
AttributeList translates to a claim about the subject.
Figure 4.12: IRMA data model with related VC entities
Making the VC data model extensible gives implementers some freedom about how to
implement their protocol within the VC ecosystem. For instance, IRMA can embed signa-
tures within the proof object of a VC. Then, IRMA needs to transparently communicate how
to implement the cryptography to enable other systems to verify that signature.
Within IRMA, maintaining and distributing the scheme is a centralized responsibility.
The role associated with this responsibility is called scheme manager. Hence, within IRMA
for each scheme, there is a centralized root of trust. All parties need to trust the scheme
manager to maintain the scheme correctly. IRMA solves this trust issue by signing the con-
tent of a scheme. Then, each party can verify the integrity of the scheme. In VC the scheme
manager role is called verifiable data registry. VC does not provide guidelines on how a
system shall maintain and distribute scheme information.
IRMA enforces data verification by verifiying messages within irmago based on infor-
mation within a scheme. VC introduces the concept of CredentialSchema to enable parties
to share data verification information by resolving URIs, for instance, via JSON schemas. To
ensure the integrity of the data obtained via CredentialSchema, most recent literature, such
as Muehle et al. [27], or projects, like Sovrin, emphasize or employ blockchain technologies
in combination with DIDs.
The VC specification provides us with other advanced concepts, which IRMA currently
does not support:
Status The current status of a credential, e.g., indicate whether a credential is suspended
or revoked;
Refreshing Automatically refresh an expired credential;
Terms of Use Parties can use this to communicate terms under which VCs can be used;
Evidence Includes additional evidence supporting the verifier to establish sufficient con-
fidence in the claims within a credential;
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Disputes For example, if a holder disputed a claim made by an issuer, e.g., the address is
incorrect.
They are out-of-scope for this research.
All roles defined within the VC specification are also available within the IRMA system.
The definition of claims and also credentials are the same on a conceptual level. Also,
the concept of a verifiable presentation is similar within IRMA and called a “disclosure
proof”.
Certain metadata is essential in any user-centric IMS. Therefore, both IRMA and VC
have metadata in common. In particular, the issuer that issued the credential, when it was
issued, and when it expires.
IRMA uses zero-knowledge proofs in both issuing and disclosure sessions. Since the
VC specification explicitly supports ZKP to be used in a disclosing session, we can generate
a ZKP presentation based on the IRMA data model. Later in this research, we elaborate on
this again when creating a prototype in chapter 6.
According to the VC specification, services or applications can use any data representa-
tion syntax, such as XML or JSON, capable of expressing the data model. Yet, all serializa-
tion syntaxes need to translate to the data model deterministically to enable other parties
to process and validate messages in the same way. The data model can be encoded en-
tirely by utilizing JSON, and IRMA uses JSON to exchange messages between the different
components. Also, in theory, it might be easy to modify IRMA to support JSON-LD.
All source codes of IRMA and VC are open-source and stored in different repositories
on GitHub.
We conclude that it might be possible to modify IRMA to comply to the VC standard
with acceptable effort. We identify overlap in roles, definitions of key concepts, and meta-
data. Also, VC supports the use of ZKP. IRMA uses JSON, and implementers can express the
VC data model in JSON. We show how we can align the IRMA data model with entities of
the VC data model. Also, VC leaves implementers freedom on how to implement a protocol
due to the data model’s extensibility.
In the following chapter, we identify requirements to describe which modifications within





In this chapter, we first elaborate on the requirements of the VC data model. Then, since
we concluded in the previous chapter that one of the essential goals of VC is to advance in-
teroperability between user-centric IMSs, we explore which use-cases exist between IRMA
and other systems. Those use-cases help us to analyze further which distinct challenges
exist to achieve interoperability between IRMA and other systems. Then, we can identify
modifications within IRMA to handle those challenges. Afterward, to show the impact of
the modifications on the IRMA architecture, we conduct an architectural impact analysis.
At last, we provide other systems with a list of modifications they need to take into account
if they want to connect with IRMA.
5.1. VC REQUIREMENTS
The VC data model categorizes its requirements based on words defined in RFC 2119 [44].
Commonly, standards use RFC 2119 to indicate requirements. We describe in the following
list briefly the words used in the VC data model:
MUST The given definition is an absolute requirement of the data model;
MUST NOT The given definition is an absolute prohibition of the data model;
MAY The given definition is truly optional;
SHOULD / RECOMMENDED The given definition may be ignored due to valid reasons in
particular circumstances.
Any conforming system at least needs to meet the absolute requirements and prohibi-
tions to become compliant with the VC standard. Via the vc-test-suite any implementation
can validate if it conforms to the VC data model.1 we list the absolute requirements and
prohibitions of the VC Data model in appendix C.
A VC system can use a verifiable presentation in a disclosing session. However, it is
not mandatory to implement the verifiable presentation concept. For instance, a system
1Official repository of the vc-test-suite: https://github.com/w3c/vc-test-suite
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could only implement the issuing part, and still wants to conform with the VC standard.
But within IRMA, credentials are disclosed. Consequently, IRMA shall employ a verifiable
presentation. When a verifiable presentation is used in combination with ZKPs, additional
requirements and prohibitions apply. We list those also in appendix C.
5.2. USE-CASES
Malan et al. state in [25] that “use cases have quickly become a widespread practice for
capturing functional requirements”. A use-case describes how an actor can achieve a par-
ticular goal when using a system. To visualize different goals from different actors in one
figure, often a use-case diagram is used.
Figure 5.1: IRMA and VC use-cases
To extend IRMA’s interoperability, we are interested in use-cases where either an IRMA
user interacts with actors from other systems or a non-IRMA user interacts with IRMA ac-
tors. Hence, we can identify the four use-cases in use-case diagram 5.1. In theory, it is
possible to identify eight use-cases between the actors from left to right, which we show
for completeness reasons in table 5.1. Use-cases, in which only IRMA actors participate,
are already implemented, and not relevant for this research. Additionally, we are not inter-
ested in use-cases between only external actors, as IRMA is not involved. For example, a
non-IRMA user receives credentials from an external issuer. Subsequently, she uses those
credentials in a disclosure session with an external verifier.
Use-case 1 shows a user using the IRMA app. The user wants to request credentials
from an issuer, which is not employing an IRMA server. Afterward, the user wants to store
those credentials within the IRMA app. Challenging here is that the app needs to store the
credential with all its properties.
Use-case 2 shows an end-user using the IRMA app. The user has credentials stored on
her phone. Then, she wants to authenticate to a verifier, which is not employing an IRMA
server to disclose credentials to an external verifier. Interesting in this use-case is that the
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Table 5.1: Complete use-cases
Use-case Id Actor IN Actor OUT Action
1 External issuer User 1 Issue Credentials
2 User 1 External Verifier Disclose credentials
3 IRMA Issuer User 2 Issue Credentials
4 User 2 IRMA Verifier Disclose credentials
5 External Issuer User 2 Issue Credentials
6 User 2 External Verifier Disclose credentials
7 IRMA Issuer User 1 Issue Credentials
8 User 1 IRMA Verifier Disclose credentials
IRMA app needs to scan and process a non-IRMA QRCode. Also, the app needs to compute
a verifiable presentation that external verifiers can process.
Use-case 3 shows an end-user using a non-IRMA wallet app. The end-user requests
credentials from the IRMA issuer. The issuer returns the credentials. The challenge in this
use-case is to compute VC-compliant credentials.
Use-case 4 shows an end-user using a non-IRMA wallet app. The user has credentials
stored on her phone. Then, she wants to authenticate to an IRMA verifier by disclosing
credentials via a verifiable presentation. In this use-case, the exciting part is that the IRMA
server must be able to process a verifiable presentation. Subsequently, the server needs to
obtain relevant metadata from an external system.
In the following paragraphs, for each use-case, we describe which interactions between
actors are needed to realize the use-case. We choose to use sequence diagrams as we al-
ready describe the IRMA protocol via sequence diagrams in appendix B. Interactions be-
tween actors or actions within an actor leading to modifications within IRMA are marked
bold in the diagrams and elaborated later on. Additionally, we limit ourselves by focusing
on happy flows, and thus, we leave unhappy flows, in particular error handling, out-of-
scope for this work.
Within each use-case, we mention that a user needs to scan a QRCode. However, within
IRMA, it is also possible that instead of a QRCode, the requesting party embeds an IRMA
deep-link in case the user uses a mobile browser. Then, the IRMA app opens directly in-
stead of showing a QRCode, thereby establishing the session between the user and IRMA
server.2 Also, it is possible to employ other technologies such as Bluetooth or NFC. But we
leave them out-of-scope for this research.
External issuer issues credentials to IRMA user As shown in figure 5.2, the user first
needs to open the website from the external issuer. The issuer asks the user to authenti-
cate to verify the user’s authenticity before establishing an issuing session and showing her
the QRCode. Then, the user scans the QRCode via the IRMA app. Subsequently, the IRMA
app sends a commitment, and the external issuer returns the generated VC. Finally, the
IRMA app needs to store the received VC to be able to use it in a disclosing session.
2See https://irma.app/docs/api-irmajs/#handlesession for the related technical documentation.
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Figure 5.2: Use-case 1 - External issuer issues to IRMA user
Figure 5.3: Use-case 2 - IRMA user discloses to external verifier
IRMA user discloses credentials to external verifier A prerequisite for this use-case, as
depicted in figure 5.3 is that the user already has credentials stored in the IRMA app. The
user opens the website from the verifying party, and the browser agent shows QRCode.
In the next step, the user scans the QRCode with the IRMA app, and consequently, the
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external verifier requests to disclose attributes. After the user gave consent, the IRMA app
computes a verifiable presentation and send it to the external verifier. The external verifier
then verifies the retrieved presentation, wherefore it has to obtain specific metadata.
Figure 5.4: Use-case 3 - IRMA issuer issues to non-IRMA user
IRMA issuer issues credentials to non-IRMA user As shown in figure 5.4, a user opens,
as usual, the website of the issuer. The issuer asks her to authenticate, and after doing so,
the issuer, which runs an IRMA issuing server instance, returns the QRCode to the users’
browser agent. The user scans the QRCode with her non-IRMA wallet app to establish a
connection with the issuer. Then, the app computes and sends the commitment to the
IRMA issuer. After verifying the commitment, the issuing server creates a VC and returns it
to the users’ wallet app. If the user uses those credentials in a disclosing session, the verifier
has to obtain metadata.
Non-IRMA user discloses credentials to IRMA verifier As shown in figure 5.5, first, the
user visits the verifiers’ website and then scans the QRCode with her non-IRMA wallet app
to establish the disclosing session between the app and the IRMA server of the verifier.
Then, the app asks the verifier to send the disclosure request. After the user approves the
request, the app sends a verifiable presentation to the verifier. The verifier must be able to
parse the verifiable presentation and request and process metadata to be able to verify the
presentation.
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Figure 5.5: Use-case 4 - Non-IRMA user authenticates to IRMA verifier
5.2.1. IRMA MODIFICATIONS
Based on the interactions within the four use-cases, we can identify modifications within
IRMA to realize the use-cases, which we list in table 5.2. Each row in the table leads to
one modification based on one or more related use-cases, the involved actor, and the (in-
ter)action. In the following paragraphs, we describe each modification in more detail.
1: Scan QRCode Currently, there is no standard available that specifies how to compute
a QRCode within a VC system. Hence, for each new system that IRMA wants to interact
with, we need to implement the parsing of the QRCode manually. Within IRMA, the QR-
Code consists of session information, which the app uses to establish a connection with
the requestor. For other systems, the QRCode might contain similar information, but the
structure of the QRCode itself can be very different.
2: Compute Presentation If other parties deploy a non-IRMA server for verifying pur-
poses in a disclosing session, and a user wants to disclose credentials stored in the IRMA
app, the IRMA app needs to be able to compute a verifiable presentation after the session
is initialized.
3: Send Presentation Subsequently, the IRMA app sends the verifiable presentation to
the verifying party via an interface. The QRCode contains information about the interface,
or the QRCode contains information on how to get the relevant interface information.
4: Obtain IRMA Metadata After the computed verifiable presentation is send to the non-
IRMA verifying party, the verifier wants to verify the disclosed attributes. Therefore, the
verifier requests metadata that is referred to within a verifiable presentation. Most impor-
tantly, the verifiers need to retrieve information about the issuer, including the public key.
We can argue why a relying party should not download the IRMA scheme as IRMA par-
ties also do. However, for external parties, it shall be more convenient to request the specific
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Table 5.2: Modifications identified via use-cases
Id Use-case Actor Interaction Modification
1 1 / 2 IRMA app Scan QRCode The IRMA app must be able to parse
QRCode of external actors




The IRMA app must be able to com-
pute a verifiable presentation
3 2 IRMA app
Send verifiable
presentation
The IRMA app must be able to send
the verifiable presentation
4 2 / 3 External verifier
Obtain IRMA
metadata
External actors must be able to ob-
tain relevant IRMA metadata
5 1 IRMA app
Compute
commitment
The IRMA app must be able to com-
pute a commitment
6 1 IRMA app Store VC The IRMA app must be able to store
a VC
7 3 IRMA server
Receive
commitment
The IRMA server must be able to re-
ceive a committed VC
8 3 IRMA server Compute VC The IRMA server must be able to
compute a VC
9 4 IRMA server
Verify verifiable
presentation
The IRMA server must be able to
verify a verifiable presentation
10 4 IRMA server
Obtain external
metadata
The IRMA server must be able to ob-
tain required metadata to verify the
presentation
information they need via the URIs in VC messages. It would be inconvenient for external
parties to download the whole scheme and then to filter out the relevant information.
5: Compute Commitment The IRMA app shall request credentials from an external is-
suer after the user has scanned the QRCode in an issuance session. In most ABC sys-
tems, such as in IRMA, the client needs to commit to the VC via a committed credential.
Since we expect that other systems use a similar feature, the IRMA-app shall compute a
VC-compliant commitment message.
6: Store VC The IRMA app must be able to store a VC permanently. If other VC systems
implement concepts, such as “terms of use”, and those systems require any connecting
system to support those concepts, IRMA must implement those concepts as well.
7: Receive committed VC The non-IRMA wallet app needs to be able to compute a com-
mitment message based on the earlier received nonce in an issuance session (see 6 for
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reference) as otherwise, the IRMA server is not able to compute the CL signature within the
VC.
8: Compute VC The IRMA server needs to compute a signed VC. Here we need to take
the MUST-have requirements of the VC data model into consideration. As the messaging is
synchronous, the server can just return the signed VC as the response.
9: Verify Presentation If a user with a non-IRMA wallet app sends a verifiable presen-
tation to the IRMA server in a disclosing session, the IRMA server wants to verify the ver-
ifiable presentation. As cryptographic protocols can differ between systems, we need to
extend IRMA in such a way to support those protocols. Subsequently, IRMA can verify the
signatures within the verifiable presentation.
10: Obtain external Metadata To be able to verify the received presentation, the IRMA
server needs to obtain the relevant metadata from external systems. In the VC data model,
the examples mostly employ DIDs. As a lot of new user-centric systems employ blockchains
and DIDs, IRMA might need to resolve DIDs. Then, IRMA can parse the related DID docu-
ments.
5.3. ARCHITECTURAL IMPACT
Lehmans’ [22] second Law, “Increasing Complexity”, states that, if we do not adequately
handle changes, the complexity of the software system increases, making it more challeng-
ing to maintain the system in the future. Hence, before implementing a software change, it
is useful to analyze which impact changes have on the architecture of the software. Williams
and Carver [40] developed a classification scheme called Software Architecture Change Char-
acterization Scheme (SACCS) to conduct change impact analysis. After conducting three
empirical studies, Williams and Carver conclude [41] that “SACCS provides insight into the
difficulty of a change request, SACCS helps to facilitate discussion among developers, and
SACCS is a useful tool for supporting change implementation”. Hence, we decide to use
this scheme, as it uses findings of previous research to classify changes. Also, it is easy to
apply the scheme, and it helps to facilitate discussions. I decided to group all the modifi-
cations described in the previous section together as one change request (CR). Analyzing
each change one-by-one is a cumbersome and too time-consuming task for the scope of
this research.
By applying the method, we identify general characteristics of the change, i.E., motiva-
tion and type of the change, size, impact on static and dynamic system properties, and the
features and quality attributes affected. In appendix D, we provide the curious reader with
a summary of descriptions of characteristics used hereafter if it is unclear what is meant
by it. Also, SACCS provides us with the specific characterization, which allows us to provide
more detail about the effects of the CR on the logical and runtime structures. However,
we leave the specific characterization out-of-scope of this research. Nevertheless, the re-
sult of applying this method is to facilitate a discussion with stakeholders of IRMA to help
them decide whether it is feasible to implement the CR. Subsequently, it helps to identify
architectural areas to focus on when implementing the CR.
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The motivation of the CR is an enhancement as we want to enhance IRMA by comply-
ing with the VC data model and extend the interoperability of IRMA. The source of the CR
is stakeholder request initially based on the topic listed in A provided by my supervisor Greg
Alpar, and consequently the critically/importance is requested. The developer experience,
which is myself, I would consider localized as I am familiar with the architecture of IRMA.
But not extensively as I only started studying it about a year ago. The category attribute,
in my opinion, might be perfective, because it also helps to better meet user needs in the
future when VC-compliant systems become more popular. Also, we could include adap-
tive, as our goal is to make IRMA compliant with the VC standard. The granular effect is
architectural as we do not change system functions visible to the user. The property of
the CR is in my opinion both static and dynamic. Static, as there is the need to update the
underlying data model of IRMA to comply to the VC specification. Dynamic, as we need
to introduce a new interface that during runtime responds to external actor’s requests to
deliver metadata.
In the following tables, we score characteristics, based on an impact scale, and also
motivate the score. The impact scale determines the impact the change has on the given
attribute. It starts with score 0, meaning no impact, and ends with 5, meaning major focus
of change.
In the first table 5.3, we list and score the related logical and runtime characteristics.
Unfortunately, SACCS focuses on object-oriented software characteristics, but we try to
align it with the concepts of go as well as we can. In the second table, we determine how
the CR affects functional requirements, also called features, by listing the different areas in
table 5.4. In the third table 5.5, we list the different quality attributes and score them. From
an architectural point-of-view it is helpful to assess how quality attributes, based on ISO
Standard 25010, are affected by the CR.3 We could conduct a more in-depth analysis of each
attribute, but this beyond the scope of this thesis. Also, it is more useful to conduct when
connecting to other systems. The IRMA project guarantees specific security properties due
to cryptographic protocol choices, as described in section 4.1.3. Hence, we elaborate later
on security aspects in more detail.
In sum, we can argue that the CR might impact many characteristics to a great extent.
Yet, this depends mostly on the system, with which IRMA wants to exchange messages.
Hence, we advise the IRMA project to conduct a new change impact analysis for each new
system. However, we think the above analysis gives a good overview of how IRMA’s archi-
tecture is affected. If initially, IRMA “only” wants to comply with the VC data model, we can
reason that the Repository Access and Source Structure attributes are most impacted, as the
underlying data model of IRMA needs to be changed.
5.3.1. COMPONENTS AND INTERFACES
Based on the CR, we show in figure 5.6 all components, their interfaces, and the interaction
between components. The CR impacts components and interfaces printed in bold type. In
the following, we describe these impacts.
First, we introduce a new component, called metadata server, which exposes two new
HTTP endpoints. The /issuer endpoint returns information about an issuer, including the
public key. The /schema endpoint returns a JSON-schema, with which an actor can verify
the content of a VC or verifiable presentation. In the next chapter, we describe how to
3See the official ISO website: https://www.iso.org/standard/35733.html.
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Layers 2 The existing layers of the IRMA system do not need to change.
Eventually, the business logic layer needs to be extended for
each new system IRMA wants to exchange messages with.
Inheritance
Structure
2 A flexible design supporting the easy addition of new systems





Source Structure 2 Moderately impacted due to the addition of VC related structs.
Dependency
Relationship





2 The flow of processing is primarily impacted by the additional




4 The IRMA app needs to store VCs. Hence the storage function-
ality needs to be refactored.
Concurrent
Processes
0 Not affected as requests are still handled one-by-one.
Component
Interaction
0 The interactions of components within IRMA is not affected.
Distributed
Components
4 IRMA needs to interact with external components via different
interfaces. We elaborate on this later in more detail.
Component
Deployment
2 The new metadata component needs to be deployed separately
with its own configuration.
implement this new component in more detail.
Second, two endpoints under the irma interface have to accept VC or verifiable presen-
tations. In the case of a disclosing session, the /proofs endpoint needs to accept verifiable
presentation. In the case of an issuing session, the /commitments endpoint needs to accept
a committed VC, and return a signed VC.
Third, each external system implements different protocols, possibly different tech-
nologies, and employs different APIs. For each of such a system, IRMA needs to be adapted.
5.3. ARCHITECTURAL IMPACT 43
Table 5.4: Features
Feature Score Motivation
Devices 0 Not impacted.
Data Access 3 The IRMA server needs to handle committed VC messages and
verifiable presentations. Also, the IRMA app needs to be able to
parse other QRCodes not generated by IRMA to establish ses-
sions with other VC systems.
Data Transfer 4 VCs, verifiable presentations, and related metadata need to be
transferred to external components.
System Interface 4 Existing interfaces need to accept VC-compliant messages.
One new interface is needed for communicating the metadata.
We elaborate on this later in more detail.
User Interface 0 Not impacted.
Communication 4 If other systems utilize, for instance, DIDs, this characteristic
can be profoundly impacted.
Computation 4 As each newly added system may use a different cryptographic
protocol, the computation characteristic might be highly im-
pacted.
Input/Output 4 Since the VC specification does not dictate which data repre-
sentation syntax to use, different systems can employ different
formats.
5.3.2. SECURITY
McGraw states [26] that the more systems are connected, the more extensible and complex
they become, the amount of security vulnerabilities increases. If security vulnerabilities
exist in a system, according to Adkins et al. [1], it has the potential to break the trust of
users quickly. Once the trust is broken, it undermines the usefulness of the system. Hence,
when adapting IRMA to become more connected (due to the metadata server), extensible
(due to permissionless innovation of VC), and complex (by additional code to support other
systems), we need to analyze the impact on security aspects of IRMA in detail.
According to Scarfone et al. [36], there exist three objectives in the classical model for
IT-security: maintaining confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Confidentiality ensures
that only an authorized person can access resources. Integrity assures that the data or sys-
tem can be trusted. Availability means that the systems or data are available when required.
We elaborate on each objective in what follows. Additionally, we elaborate on the im-
pact on IRMA’s security properties.
CONFIDENTIALITY
For confidentiality, the trust relationships in an IMS are essential. If we look at the trust
relationships in section 3.1.3, we see that issuers have a role in ensuring that only legiti-
mate users receive their credentials. Other parties need to trust the issuers that they en-
force it. On the other hand, verifiers must ensure that only users get access to resources
whose attributes match the policies. Consequently, systems need to be transparent about
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0 The functionality is not impacted by the CR.
Reliability 3 Since external systems are involved, this can be heavily im-




3 Can be impacted as VC related messages can differ in size to
the original IRMA messages computed.
Usability 0 Not impacted by this CR.
Security 4 Since the goal is to exchange messages with other systems, the
security attribute might be impacted heavily. We elaborate on
this later in this chapter.
Compatibility 4 The goal by complying with the VC standard is to make IRMA
more interoperable. This impacts the attribute massively.
Maintainability 2 To be able to execute integrated tests with other VC systems,
those systems must be available.
Transferability 0 Not affected by this CR.
the management of their trust relationships. If systems decide to exchange messages with
each other, it seems reasonable to set up agreements between the two.
INTEGRITY
IRMA employs a mechanism to protect the integrity of a scheme, as described in section 4.1.3.
However, we introduce a metadata server. The server exposes scheme information via dif-
ferent endpoints, as described in section 5.3.1. Then, external actors can request specific
scheme information via the URLs available in VC messages. Therefore, the current hashes
stored in the index file of a scheme are useless when obtaining information via the meta-
data server. Hence, we need to identify new mechanisms to enforce integrity of the infor-
mation when requesting it via URLs.
One option is to compute hashlinks for each link exposed by the scheme server. Sporny
started to develop the hashlink standard in 2018.4 It is currently a draft version. A hash-
link is a modified hyperlink. It enables consuming parties to determine if someone tam-
pered with the resource associated with the link. An advantage is that no separate system
is needed to add this level of content integrity protection next to URLs.
Another option is, similar to IRMAs current approach, to compute hashes for all pos-
sible URLs that can obtain metadata. Then, IRMA can store those hashes in a file, and
subsequently, sign that file. An advantage is that IRMA does not need to introduce any new
technology. A disadvantage is that external parties need to manually download the scheme
and check the hashes to check the integrity of the content.
4More information on hashlink under: https://w3c-ccg.github.io/hashlink/
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Figure 5.6: IRMA and externl system components and interfaces
On the other hand, if IRMA accepts credentials and presentations from other systems,
other systems must enforce integrity of the content. Also, the systems need to communi-
cate transparently about how external parties can check integrity.
AVAILABILITY
If the metadata server is not available, no external actors can verify a message. Hence, the
metadata server must be highly available. Loukas and Öke [24] argue that denial of service
(Dos) attacks are a significant threat as they are easy to launch. Defending the network, on
the other hand, is disproportionately difficult. Consequently, IRMA needs to take measures
to detect and defend against Dos attacks. Additionally, the server should be fault-tolerant.
This means that at least two instances are running in different locations. If one location has
issues and the server is not responding, the other instance can respond to requests.
IRMA SECURITY PROPERTIES
In what follows, for each security property, we describe how the proposed modifications
impact them.
Credential unforgeability We may assume safely that other systems ensure that the prop-
erty holds. Otherwise, credentials can not be trusted.
Multi-show and issuer unlinkability Within the VC data model, identifiers are optional.
In theory, however, other systems could enforce the use of identifiers to identify indi-
viduals. But this is rather unlikely, as it would reduce the privacy of the individual.
Grouping credentials using the private key This depends on the cryptographic protocol
the system employs, from which the IRMA app receives credentials. A challenge is if
a user wants to use both IRMA and non-IRMA credentials in one disclosing session.
Eavesdroppers cannot perform replay attacks This depends on the cryptographic proto-
col the system employs, which the verifier is using.
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Verifiers cannot perform replay attacks This depends on which credentials a user uses in
a disclosing session. If a user discloses only IRMA credentials, the property holds as
IRMA can apply ZKP on its credentials. If a user discloses non-IRMA credentials, it
depends if those credentials support ZKP or other mechanisms to hide parts of the
signature of the credential.
No impersonation attacks This property is inherent to the user-centric IdM concept.
No privacy hotspots This property is inherent to the user-centric IdM concept.
Selective disclosure This depends on the cryptography employed by systems that issue
credentials.
Additionally, due to the introduction of the metadata server, we can argue that scheme
mamanger can create profiles of parties requesting metadata. We might link this to the
no privacy hotspots property. If another wallet app obtains metadata when receiving cre-
dentials from the IRMA system to verify the content, the scheme manager can log which
IP requests the metadata. However, the scheme manager does not know the value of the
attributes. Also, the scheme manager can not trace a user disclosing credentials, as the ver-
ifier requests the metadata. The scheme manager does not see any content of the verifiable
presentation.
5.4. EXTERNAL SYSTEMS MODIFICATIONS
If external systems wish to exchange messages with the IRMA system, they need to apply
certain modifications as well. First, wallet apps must be able to scan the IRMA QRCode
to establish the session with the IRMA server. Second, the system needs to incorporate
the (cryptographic) protocol employed by IRMA. In case of an issuing session initiated by a
non-IRMA client, the system must be able to compute a commitment message in case of an
issuing session. Additionally, if a user using the IRMA app sends a verifiable presentation, it
must be able to verify the disclosed credentials via the signatures. Third, the system needs
to obtain the relevant metadata via the metadata server.
6
PROTOTYPE
In the previous chapter, we identify modifications within IRMA. In this chapter, first, we ex-
plain how we identify the modifications we want to implement. Then, we show how to im-
plement those, thereby delivering a prototype. Afterward, we describe how we alter IRMA
to demonstrate that the modifications work as intended. Finally, we provide an overview of
the names and URLs to the source-code repositories containing the modifications for the
proof of concept.
6.1. IDENTIFY MODIFICATIONS TO IMPLEMENT
We decided to extend IRMA with the modifications without affecting the core data model
and business logic of IRMA. This would be too complex within the scope of this research.
Consequently, we do not implement modification 6. Also, even if VC promotes interoper-
ability, it is still a tedious task to connect to another VC-compliant system. Modifications
1, 3, 7, 9 and 10 only make sense to implement when connecting to another system. But
as we want to demonstrate that the modifications work, we choose to build a custom QR-
Code. Then, after the user scans that QRCode with the IRMA app, the app concludes that it
connects to another system.
Consequently, we implement the following set of modifications:
1 The IRMA app must be able to parse the QRCode of external actors;
2 The IRMA app must be able to compute a verifiable presentation;
4 External actors must be able to obtain relevant metadata from the IRMA system;
5 The IRMA app must be able to compute a committed VC;
8 The IRMA server must be able to compute and return a VC.
In the next sections, we describe for each of the modifications, how currently IRMA
implements comparable concepts. Afterward, we describe how we need to adapt IRMA to
implement the modification. Before describing modification 2 and 4, we first describe how




6.2.1. CURRENT IRMA IMPLEMENTATION
Within IRMA the QRCode contains the URL to establish the session between the IRMA app
and the IRMA server, plus the action to be executed, as visible in the following example:
{"u":"http://localhost:8088/irma/f6JOn5NZqheTspDFISzW","irmaqr":"issuing"}
The scanning of the QRCode is implemented within the irma_mobile component in the
file components/QRScanner/QRScannerContainer.js, event readQRCode. After scanning the
QRCode, the app validates the QRCode. Afterward, within the app, a new session is initial-
ized via the NewSession method of the textitActionHandler struc type. Within that method,
the app calls the client.NewSession method belonging to the irmago library. There, the ses-
sionrequest string is parsed to a QRCode object via the UnmarshalValidate method.
6.2.2. MODIFIED IRMA IMPLEMENTATION
For each individual QRCode, we define a new struc type. Then, via the UnmarshalValidate
method within NewSession, IRMA tries to create a valid QRCode until there is a match. If
there is no QRCode match, it continues with schemeRequest := .... Then, for each external
system, within the client package, we need to implement a new method similar to newQRS-
ession.
Within the readQRCode method within irma_mobile, we need to change the validation
of the QRCode to be less restrictive to allow the IRMA app to parse non-IRMA QRCodes.
Therefore, we remove the check typeof sessionPointer.irmaqr !== ’string’.
6.3. COMPUTE VC
6.3.1. CURRENT IRMA IMPLEMENTATION
The method handlePostCommitments belonging to the session struc type computes the
message that contains the corresponding CL-signatures of the requested credentials. Then,
the method returns the credential to the method handleProtocolMessage of the server struc
type. The method handleProtocolMessage generates the to-be-returned JSON response to-
gether with the status code. Subsequently, it returns the message as a byte array.
6.3.2. MODIFIED IRMA IMPLEMENTATION
As the handleProtocolMessage returns a message as a byte array, within this method, we can
call another method that computes and returns a VC. Based on whether the client sends a
“legacy” IRMA commitment message or a VC-compliant commitment message, we either
invoke the original handlePostCommitments method or we call a new method called han-
dlePostCommitmentsVC.
In the following paragraphs, we explain how we map IRMA properties to required prop-
erties within a VC.
@context As of IRMA server version 0.30 1, the string-value of the @context property iden-
tifies what kind of session is initialized. In the VC data model, the @context property is an
ordered set. The first value always must be https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1 to let
software systems know that the messages exchanged are about VCs. The following items
1See https://irma.app/docs/next/session-requests/ for full details
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can express context information. Currently, the IRMA URL does not resolve to anything,
but this is not obligatory.
type A software system determines if a VC (or verifiable presentation) is appropriate based
on the type property. In IRMA, each credential type has a unique name. Via the method
call cred.CredentialTypeID.String() we can obtain the name. Additionally, the name of the
scheme is also part of the string to uniquely identify the credential type. Thus, we can use
this unique name to identify a credential, and add it to the type set.
credentialSubject The credentialSubject property contains the claims made about the
subject, e.g. a fullName element that contains the familyname and firstname attributes.
Within IRMA this information is stored in the AttributeList of the irma.credential. IRMA
links each credential to one subject. Hence, within a VC, we only refer to one subject within
the credentialSubject property.
issuer Each VC needs to contain an issuer property . As the property at least needs to
contain a URI, the URI deferences into information about the issuer. For instance, the in-
formation can contain the public key of the issuer to enable verifiers to verify disclosed
credentials. We can obtain the issuer information via the CredentialType. Additionally, via
the issuerID we can get the public key counter, which refers to the current public key ver-
sion: session.conf.IrmaConfiguration.PublicKeyIndices(issuerID).
issuanceDate We can calculate the issuanceDate based on the current date-time in the
ISO8601 standard format.
proof A credential needs to contain proof information to make the credential verifiable.
The type property within the proof object needs to specify which proof method the VC uses,
and how a system needs to interpret the containing signature. The CL-signature computed
in method handlePostCommitment is included in the proof property.
credentialSchema According to the VC data model, each credential used within a ZKP
presentation must include a credentialSchema. Since IRMA employs ZKP, we consequently
want to compute ZKP presentations later. The credentialSchema consists of one or more
data schemas. Each data schema needs to specify an id and type property. The id points to
the schema file via a URI. The type indicates if we want to verify the structure and contents
of a VC or encode the contents of a VC. Unfortunately, we can not figure out how we need
to implement the encoding schema.
Hence, we decided to implement a data verification scheme. Since IRMA uses the JSON-
format to exchange messages, we employ JSON schemas. JSON schema was developed as
an attempt to provide a schema language for JSON. It is comparable to XSD for XML. 2
We choose to add the aries-framework-go project as a dependency to the irmago project
as it automatically verifies a provided VC via the schemas. 3 The credentialSchema needs
2Pezoa et al. [32] provided in 2016 a formal definition of syntax and semantics for JSON Schema.
3The aries-framework-go repository on GitHub: https://github.com/hyperledger/aries-framework-
go
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to have JsonSchemaValidator2018 as type. The aries-framework aims to implement DID
standards and the VC standard. We implement the Validator interface within the VC. Then,
within the Validate method, we invoke the NewCredential method of the aries-framework-
go, as we show in listing 3.
Listing 3 Verify the content of a VC within irmago
1 func (vc *VerifiableCredential) Validate() error {
2 vcByte, _ := json.Marshal(vc)
3 _, _, err := ariesvc.NewCredential(vcByte)






6.4.1. CURRENT IRMA IMPLEMENTATION
Currently, within IRMA the verifier can send a so-called condiscon session request to the
user.4 Condiscon stands for the conjunction of disjunctions of conjunctions. This request
can give the user a choice of which set of attributes to disclose; for example, either the
BSN (A1) or full name (A2), together with the postal address of the user (A3). Formally
expressed, it looks like: ((A1 AND A3) OR (A2 AND A3)). After the user made a choice, the
IRMA app computes the corresponding disclosure proof. Then, the app sends the proof to
the verifying party, as we describe in more detail in appendix B.2. In a disclosure session,
if a verifier requests attributes from at least two different credentials, the proof message
contains for each credential one object within the proofs element. As we see in 6.1, the proof
is computed in method getProof belonging to the session struc type. Then, the disclosure
proof is send to the verifying party within the sendResponse method via the Post method of
the transport type.
6.4.2. MODIFIED IRMA IMPLEMENTATION
Within the compare and contrast 4.3 section, we conclude that IRMA employs ZKP, and VC
explicitly supports the use of ZKP. Hence, we can produce a mapping from the IRMA code
towards a ZKP verifiable presentation, as we show in figure 6.2.
We create a derived VC for each credential type within a disclosing session. In IRMA,
the metadata property contains the issuanceDate, which we can obtain via SigningDate().
For the expirationDate, the same holds via the Expiry() method, it is just not visible on
the right-hand side within the presentation. We can compute the credentialSubject for a
derived credential by looping over the DisclosedAttributes.
The presentation itself contains the @context property as VCs do as well. The second
item in the set can be https://irma.app/ld/request/disclosure/v2 as IRMA currently uses to
4More information on the official IRMA doc: https://irma.app/docs/condiscon/.
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Figure 6.1: IRMA code: compute and send proof flow
indicate an IRMA message within a disclosing session. The type property will consist of
VerifiablePresentation only. The ProofList object can be mapped to the proof property of
the verifiable presentation as it is the proof that proves the knowledge of the hidden at-
tributes, the validity of the credentials, and the fact that all the credentials in this proofs
were issued to the same user.
6.5. OBTAIN METADATA
6.5.1. CURRENT IRMA IMPLEMENTATION
In section 4.1.3, we describe how the schememanager works and how IRMA organizes
schemes. IRMA components regularly check if schemes are updated, and consequently,
download updates if a newer version if available.
6.5.2. MODIFIED IRMA IMPLEMENTATION
In the previous chapter, we introduce a metadata server to make relevant scheme informa-
tion available to external parties by dereferencing URIs.
As irmago already implements a framework for running a HTTP daemon and subse-
quently, handling HTTP requests, we decide to add the metadata server to the irmago com-
ponent. We can extend the irma server command to run a metadata daemon, which is
started via the command irma server metadata. Hence, we can deploy the metadata server
independently of other components. To achieve this, we create a new cobra.Command and
add it to the RootCommand via AddCommand. Within the Server struct type, we add a new
method, startMetadataServer, that starts the server instance, whereby this server uses an-
other port than the default IRMA server. The default port is 8089; however, administrators
can set in the server configuration another port via the property metadataport.
A new HTTP Handler, created within VCHandler() by a new Chi router instance, can
handle the requests. We mount an HTTP GET endpoint for each metadata type (issuer and
schema) within the handler. Subsequently, the method s.irmaserv.VCHandler is invoked,
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Figure 6.2: Mapping from IRMA data model to ZKP presentation
which can handle both types of requests.
Both the issuer and scheme URLs contain the name of the schema. Also, it contains the
name of the credential type, as the credential type refers to one issuer. The issuer URL ends
with the public key counter to indicate which version of the public key the issuer used to
sign the credential.




As the PbdF is maintaining the pbdf production scheme, the PbdF shall also be respon-
sible for resolving metadata requests related to the pdbf scheme. Each other party main-
taining a schema must run a metadata server.
6.6. COMPUTE COMMITMENT
6.6.1. CURRENT IRMA IMPLEMENTATION
Within the getProof method within the session stuc type, irmago returns the commitment,
which is called “secretkey-knowledge proof” within IRMA. The message itself is computed
within the method IssueCommitments within the client package.
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6.6.2. MODIFIED IRMA IMPLEMENTATION
After the app determines that a user established a session with a non-IRMA issuer, it com-
putes a VC-compliant commitment message. We can use the getProof method for adding
the logic. Then, a new method is added, called IssueCommitmentsVC, that returns the VC-
compliant commitment.
6.7. DEMONSTRATION
After implementing the modifications, we demonstrate that the modifications work as in-
tended. Since we were not able to connect to another system, we decide to adapt IRMA
to run in a simulation mode. Simulation mode means that IRMA components exchange
VC-compliant messages with each other. In what follows, we describe how we adapt IRMA
to enable the simulation mode for both the issuing and disclosing session types.
First, for modifications concerning issuing, we introduce a flag, IssueVC, to switch to
“VC-mode” within irmago. The VC-mode entails that in an issuing session established with
an IRMA server, the IRMA app computes a VC-commitment message and sends it to the
server. The handleProtocolMessage method can determine if an IRMA or VC commitment
is sent. Then, the server extracts the legacy IRMA commitment signature embedded within
the VC commitment, and consequently continues as usual.
Second, to validate the modifications concerning disclosing, we add a new QRCode
struct. We call it QRSovrin for demonstration purposes. An example of that QRCode is
as follows: {"url":"http://192.
168.2.100:8088/irma/f6JOn5NZqheTspDFISzW","action":"disclosing", "system":"sovrin"}.
When irmago maps the QRCode to the QRSovrin struct, it subsequently maps the URL to
qr.URL, and the type to qr.Type. Then, we extend the newQRSession with a flag to indicate
if the request is external or not. If it is an external request, irmago computes and sends a
verifiable presentation to the verifier. Consequently, the server can unmarshal the message
to a verifiable presentation, extract the proof, and verify it.
In appendix E, we show step-by-step how to set up and run IRMA in “VC-simulation”
mode. In the issuing session, it results in that our local IRMA server in the role of issuer
computes an ageLower VC. Via the JSON-schema, we can verify the content of the VC. In
the disclosing session, it results in a verifiable presentation. The presentation contains a
disclosed ageLower.over21 attribute.
6.8. SOURCE CODE






This chapter surveys previous work related to identity management, focusing on the topic
of interoperability between IMSs. Therefore, we first summarize the projects ABC4Trust
and FIDIS, both heavily funded by the EU. They both aim to advance identity manage-
ment. The W3C working group published the final recommendation version of the VC
specification at the end of 2019. Hence, it is hard to find work that addresses the same
central problem as this research does. At least, we introduce a thesis about SolidVC, which
is a decentralized framework based on VC. Then, we take these three works and relate the
goals and deliverables with IRMA, VC, and our research. Lastly, based on the requirements
identified by the FIDIS project, we analyze how the other related work projects contribute
to them.
The FIDIS project, established in the early 2000s, had the vision to explore “the rela-
tionship between identification and identity in a high-tech environment; and implications
for the workings of democracy and rule of law in the European Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice (Art. 29 Treaty of the European Union)”.1 As a result, it delivered “integrated
approaches to research”, “legal, socio-economic, usability and application requirements”,
and “public architecture & specifications”.
Interestingly, one of the research topics is “interoperability of identities and identity
management systems”. Researchers published, amongst others, documents about approaches
on interoperability. Subsequently, they published a set of requirements for interoperability
of IMSs [5] based on interviews with experts from the private and public sectors. One of
the results is figure 7.1, which visualizes how they group interoperability of IMSs into three
themes. They conclude that developing a standard is but a first step in the process of in-
teroperation. Additional work lies in harmonizing legislative and policy rules. Those rules
describe how personal information and identity management are defined, processed, and
exchanged. For instance, there needs to be legal clarification on the reuse of issued creden-
tials outside of the country in which they were issued. Also, at the social and cultural level,
we need to understand the different contexts in which IMSs are built and used. They argue
that all those points need to be understood and addressed before we can progress towards
full interoperability.
Bakchouse [5] states that “in some contexts interoperability is seen as the enemy of
privacy. Indeed, lack of interoperability may be seen as a bulwark against intrusion into the
1FIDIS official website: http://www.fidis.net/about/
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privacy of personal information. Privacy activists take comfort from the fact that different
IMS may not be able to exchange identity information”. Hence, the SE-community needs
to communicate the benefits of the decentral nature of user-centric systems to citizens.
The above quote does not hold for such systems, as users become the data controller. Only
then citizens realize that interoperability is not the enemy, but their friend in this context.
Figure 7.1: FIDIS interoperability themes grouped by perspectives (copy from [5])
In 2010, the EU largely funded a research and development project, ABC4Trust [35].
It intends to advance ABC-technologies. One of the deliverables is an extensive architec-
tural document, containing features and concepts of Privacy-ABCs, architecture, a proto-
col specification, an API, and a crypto architecture. They define Privacy-ABCs as allowing
holders to derive new tokens. Consequently, it protects the privacy of the user. The goal
of the architecture is the definition of a common unified architecture to enable different
ABC systems to interchange messages. It results in that users can receive credentials from
different systems. Subsequently, users can use them on the same hardware and software
without noticing differences. Additionally, requesting parties, such as issuers and verifiers,
can choose which system they want to adopt if those systems implement the protocol.
The architecture itself is using a layered approach to separate responsibilities. The ad-
vantage is that the API and protocol can exist independently from algorithms or cryptog-
raphy used, and are technology agnostic. Developers can utilize the API to connect their
applications to different ABC engines. The protocol provides a specification for data arti-
facts, similar to what the VC specification provides. The specification itself is described in
XML, but it is possible to utilize different syntaxes such as JSON. The cryptographic engine
is delivered as a separate library. Implementers can use them without the engine due to the
layered approach. To sum up, in contrast to the VC specification, it also delivers a protocol
and an API specification.
We can only assume that both IRMA and VC got inspired by several concepts described
in the architecture document. In particular, IRMA also implements features such as key
binding, commitment scheme, and blind signature schemes (also called CLSignature).
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SolidVC promotes itself as “a decentralized framework for Verifiable Credentials on the
web” [15]. SolidVC is built on top of Solid (standing for Social Linked Data), which Tim
Berners-Lee initiated. He has the vision to decentralize the web, whereby Solid can con-
tribute to it. Solid promises that people regain power over their data. It is a web-based
framework of decentralized applications. It provides users with services to manage their
data, which can be everything from e-mails to videos. As the name already suggests, Solid
uses the concept of linked data.
SolidVC uses the openness of Solid, employing its technology stack, and combine it with
VC. Consequently, it delivers a decentralized framework for VCs. The framework does not
rely on blockchain technology. SolidVC utilizes JSON-LD signatures to implement digital
signatures. 2 According to Ezike [15], due to the usage of open web protocols and specifica-
tions, SolidVC is interoperable. However, as SolidVC is dependent on the Solid framework,
other VC systems need to incorporate parts of Solid to connect with SolidVC.
In table 7.1, we relate the goals and deliverables of the three projects, with the goals and
deliverables IRMA, VC, and this research. Both FIDIS and ABC4Trust elaborate on the in-
teroperability of IdMs. The significant difference is that FIDIS describes on a higher level
which challenges exist and how to tackle them. ABC4Trust proposes solutions to chal-
lenges, in particular, by providing an open protocol and API specification. As the name
already suggests, ABC4Trust uses the concept of ABC. Subsequently, it tries to advance
ABC-technology by defining an architecture and delivering open reference implementa-
tion. IRMA uses some of the concepts defined by ABC4Trust. The main goal of the VC
standard is to advance interoperability between user-centric systems by delivering an un-
ambiguous specification. SolidVC uses the VC specification to build a decentralized VC-
platform. Within our work, we research on the relation between IRMA and VC by compar-
ing and contrasting the goals and concepts of both. Consequently, we build an “IRMA VC
prototype” to show how to extend IRMAs interoperability. Additionally, we provide recom-
mendations for both the PbDF and W3C.
Additionally, in table 7.2, we take the main results from expert interviews identified by
the FIDIS project [4]. Then, we explain how the other related works, including this one, can
contribute to those results.
To sum up, we see that the FIDIS project investigated which challenges exist to advance
the interoperability of IMSs. Also, it provides us with a set of requirements to help to tackle
those challenges. The ABC4Trust project delivers a unified architecture for ABC systems,
including a specification and protocol. SolidVC shows how to implement the VC speci-
fication to build a decentralized user-centric system without having to employ blockchain
technology. We show in this research how we can modify an existing identity system, IRMA,
to extend its interoperability. Hence from a technological perspective, we can argue that
many issues are tackled. However, the industry needs to discuss and apply solutions more
broadly. Still, from the legal and cultural perspectives, many challenges exist to enable in-
teroperability, which needs more research in the future. At least new legislation within the
EU, in particular the GDPR, might indicate that legislators actively work on the legal and
cultural issues. Also, if we as a society want to see improvements in the field of identities
and identity management, the society itself needs to invest more time and resources to
foster the discussion, and subsequently, advance the field.
2See following repo for the implementation: https://github.com/digitalbazaar/jsonld-signatures
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Table 7.1: Goals and deliverables of related and this work
Project Start year Objectives Deliverables
FIDIS 2004 Explore relationship between
identity and identification; re-
search about interoperability






ABC4Trust 2010 Define a common, unified ar-
chitecture for ABC systems,
Delivering open reference im-
plementations.
ABC architecture, Open refer-
ence implementation.




VC 2017 Promote interoperability
to prevent vendor lock-in,
and seamless integration of
different systems.
Unambiguous specification
including a data model and
syntax.
SolidVC 2019 Research about decentralized
VC platform.
Decentralized VC platform
built with the open protocols
of the Web, master thesis.
IRMA VC 2019 Research about relation be-
tween IRMA and VC.
Compare and contrast the
two, build an “IRMA VC-
prototype” to extend IRMA’s
interoperability, provide rec-
ommendations for PbDF and
W3C.
58 7. RELATED WORK
Table 7.2: FIDIS themes and related work contributions
Topic Contribution
Semantic issues of meaning and interpreta-
tion must be clear and unambiguous.
Both ABC4Trust and VC contribute to this
point by delivering a specification.
Ability to communicate to the population
about how the system works and what its
benefits are.
Both private and public sectors need to con-
tribute to this point. IRMA tries to show
via different use-cases what benefits there
are by using such a system. SolidVC shows
how other decentralized VC platforms can
be build.
One of the main requirements is the pri-
vacy of personal information and compli-
ance with data protection legislation.
Several legislations within the EU in recent
years, such as GDPR, have the objective to
improve the privacy of its citizens. As one
crucial point within GDPR is the “right to
data portability”, according to [13], “it can
be the opportunity to foster interoperability
of services”.
Governments need to play a crucial role
in establishing interoperability technology
standards and laws.
The EU funded FIDIS and ABC4Trust pri-
marily. Also, the EU funds the W3C; see
the W3C funding website: https://www.
w3.org/Consortium/nmfunds/.
Usability is a vital factor. Projects such as IRMA can play a crucial
role, as they focus a lot on usability.
More investigation needed for the impor-
tance of technology.
IRMA and SolidVC can contribute due to its
open nature. In our research we show how





In this chapter, we discuss the findings of our research. Then, we elaborate on the limita-
tions of this research. Also, for both the PbDF and the W3C, we list recommendations. For
the PbDF, we give recommendations for possible future work. For the W3C, we give ideas
on how to improve their process and communication.
8.1. DISCUSSION
In what follows, we place different discussion aspects in separate subsections. First, we
elaborate on how the results extend IRMA’s interoperability. Second, we discuss what it
means to make IRMA compliant with the VC standard and its impact. Third, we elaborate
on the activities needed when connecting with another VC-compliant system. Fourth, we
debate about the non-technical challenges. There, we introduce the idea of a chicken-
egg problem between the industry, legislators, and the public. Fifth, we list the costs and
benefits for the PbDF when making IRMA compliant with the VC standard. At last, we
advise the PbDF on how to move forward.
8.1.1. EXTENDING IRMA’S INTEROPERABILITY
The goal of a standard such as the VC is to advance interoperability; in this particular case,
interoperability between user-centric, decentralized IMS. After conforming to the VC stan-
dard, the results indicate that IRMA extends its interoperability. The same structure for
data is used (syntax), and the meaning of data is unambiguously defined (semantics). It
results in reaching level three of LCIM 3.3.
We can even reason about why IRMA does not reach level four of LCIM. According to
Wang et al. [38], to reach the fourth level of LCIM, “a method for sharing meaning of terms
and methods for anticipating context are required”. Taxonomies, ontology, and UML arti-
facts are approaches for defining such a method. The VC data model defines taxonomies
by defining the different concepts and describing the relationship between them, for in-
stance, by describing the relationship between a verifiable presentation, containing one or
more credentials, which each contain one or more credential subjects. Recently, Feilmayr
and Wöß [16] refined the definition of an ontology as follows: “An ontology is a formal,
explicit specification of a shared conceptualization that is characterized by high semantic
59
60 8. DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
expressiveness required for increased complexity.” We can argue that the VC specification
is precisely this, as it defines concepts that are shared between systems conforming to the
VC standard. IRMA itself offers extensive documentation about its protocol and APIs sup-
ported by UML diagrams.
8.1.2. MAKE IRMA COMPLIANT AND ITS IMPACT
After making IRMA compliant with the VC standard, the IRMA system does not improve
other features, for instance, increasing the privacy of its users or security of the IRMA sys-
tem. Both IRMA and VC base their concepts on user-centric, decentralized IdM. In partic-
ular, we see that IRMA already employs the core concepts of VC. The flow of information
between roles in VC supports the flow of information in IRMA.
The result of developing the prototype may indicate that modifying the IRMA data model
to comply with the VC data model might be manageable. The main concepts of IRMA and
VC are similar, as we show in figure 4.12. Also, IRMA already employs the JSON format,
which makes it easy to express VC-compliant messages with IRMA.
Therefore, the prototype might suggest that it is straightforward to exchange and pro-
cess VC-compliant messages from other systems. However, the VC specification does not
provide us with a definition of protocols and APIs. Also, other IMS can use different tech-
nologies. This does it not make trivial to implement the modifications that are needed
when connecting with another IMS that comply with the VC standard.
Nevertheless, the VC standard introduces the goal of permissionless innovation. With
permissionless innovation, systems can extend the data model in various ways. The benefit
of being extensible is that systems independently can innovate and improve their solutions.
Then, they can share those solutions transparently with the industry. Consequently, com-
panies might learn from each other. Learning from each other might lead to identifying
best practices, thereby improving together along the way. Additionally, extensibility allows
systems such as IRMA to comply with the VC standard later without the need to change
their employed protocol and technologies.
The results of the SACCS method show that the impact on the architecture of IRMA is
significant when implementing the modifications. If the PbDF decides to employ a meta-
data server for their official PbdF scheme, the PbDF needs to take additional measures to
protect integrity (for instance, via hashlinks) and availability (i.E., protection against DoS
attacks) of the metadata. Additionally, the PbDF should communicate to other parties what
best practices are when employing a metadata server.
With IRMA, the security properties guarantee a high level of privacy for individuals.
Also, it protects against abuse. After making IRMA compliant with VC, we are most confi-
dent that all security properties of IRMA still hold. This is primarily due to VC’s decentral
architecture, making identifiers optional, and supporting ZKP. However, when the PbDF
decides to connect with another VC-compliant system, it depends on that system, how
well the security properties hold. In particular, it depends on which protocol and tech-
nology the system employs, as VC leaves implementers much freedom. Hence, the PbDF
needs to analyze the impact on the architecture on a case-by-case basis again.
8.1.3. CONNECTING TO A VC-COMPLIANT SYSTEM
If IRMA decides to connect to a VC-compliant system, we list in what follows the different
activities the PbDF should conduct:
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Describe required modifications Modifications 1, 3, 7, 9, and 10 need to be described in
detail.
Conduct architectural impact analysis The PbDF should conduct a more comprehensive
architectural impact analysis based on the modifications.
Decide The PbDF needs to decide if it accepts the modifications and their impact on the
architecture.
Modify IRMA The PbDF has to implement the modifications within IRMA.
Set up agreement Also, the PbDF shall set up an agreement with the organization respon-
sible for the other system. Such an agreement can contain information on how to
handle performance aspects or security properties affected.
As we can see in the implementation report of VC, other systems already comply with
the VC standard.1 However, we found no evidence that systems use the extended interop-
erability to exchange messages with each other.
8.1.4. NON-TECHNICAL CHALLENGES
As identified in the previous chapter, challenges also exist in non-technical areas. Legisla-
tors and society need to discuss the legal and cultural challenges more extensively.
One of the more significant issues is the management of trust between parties and sys-
tems. Trust is essential for each IMS, as without the trust of its users, no system has a
future. IRMA introduces the role of a scheme manager, which all other parties need to trust
that participate in the related scheme, for managing the public keys of issuers and defini-
tions of credentials correctly. Hence, it is a centralized, trusted third party. New systems, for
instance, Sovrin, employ blockchain technology to decentralize this responsibility. The ad-
vantage is that issuers can manage their metadata, credential definitions, and public keys
without having to trust a centralized party. However, blockchain-based IMSs still need a
governance structure that makes the system trustworthy to users. Hence, decentralizing
responsibilities does not magically solve trust issues.
Also, as stated in the previous chapter, legal issues exist when a user wants to use her
credentials in environments with different laws and regulations. For instance, imagine a
user travels abroad to the US and wants to use her IRMA ageLower credential to prove in
an American store that she is above 21 years old to buy beer. Is the store allowed to accept
the IRMA ageLower credential?
It is also possible to see the goal of extending user-centric, decentralized IMS’s interop-
erability as a chicken-egg problem. The industry waits for legislators to enact policies to
drive adoption of the identity model, and also waits for the society to discuss opportunities
and challenges. However, policymakers and society wait for the industry to show what is
possible from a technology perspective. Consequently, both sides wait for each other to
act first. If the PbDF takes the opportunity to act first, it can become a pioneer in this field
within the Netherlands or even the EU. Becoming a pioneer might increase their visibility
and impact.
1See the implementation report on https://w3c.github.io/vc-test-suite/implementations/
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8.1.5. COSTS AND BENEFITS FOR THE PBDF
In table 8.1, we list costs and benefits for the PbDF if it makes IRMA compliant with the
VC standard. The benefits are that we can extend IRMA’s interoperability. Also, the PbDF
can actively contribute to the discussion between industry, legislators, and citizens. By
contributing, the PbDF can become a pioneer in the field. Consequently, it can build up
additional knowledge from the field. The costs are that it makes IRMA more complex (e.g.,
due to the introduction of the metadata server), and thus, harder to maintain. Also, initially,
the PbDF needs to invest in additional resources.
Table 8.1: Costs and benefits when IRMA adapts the VC standard
Benefits Costs
Extend IRMA’s interoperability Makes IRMA more complex
Contribute to discussion Makes IRMA more complex
Become pioneer in the field Additional investment
Increase knowledge
8.1.6. ADVICE FOR THE PBDF
We consider our findings as valuable for the PbDF. The findings give insight into how to
modify IRMA to comply with the VC standard, and which consequences it has. We advise
the PbDF to invest resources to modify IRMA to become compliant with the VC standard.
As software engineers, we learned that the later we fix something, the more expensive it
becomes in the end. Also, we encourage the PbDF to take a leading role by explaining to
legislators and citizens what the opportunities and challenges are by advancing interoper-
ability. In the far future, however, this might result in fewer people and organizations using
IRMA as there are interoperable alternatives. Those might work well together with other
VC-compliant systems.
8.2. LIMITATIONS
We can not for sure say what the exact impact is on the IRMA codebase and architecture of
the modifications. It is beyond the scope of this project to implement the VC data model
fully. Also, due to time constraints, we were not able to exchange messages with another
VC-compliant system. As it is not a trivial change, we cannot be precise about the impact
as well.
As mentioned before, there are non-technical challenges to tackle if the industry wants
to make VC a success. As those challenges need to involve legislators and society as a whole,
more work needs to be conducted by non-technical experts in the future.
We tried to get in touch again with people from the VC working group after having an
initial interview, but this was not successful. Also, asking on other communication chan-
nels such as GitHub for support was not fruitful after the working group finalized the speci-
fication. Hence, due to a lack of knowledge, for instance, we did not succeed in implement-
ing a data encoding scheme.
Again, due to time constraints, we did not discuss our results with members of the




8.3.1. POSSIBLE FUTURE WORK FOR THE PBDF
RESEARCH ABOUT DECENTRALIZING THE IRMA SCHEME
Currently, other systems employ blockchain technology to store metadata information.2
Blockchain technology protects the integrity of the content.
Other technologies such as InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) might also be an alterna-
tive.3 IPFS is a protocol for storing and sharing data in a distributed file system. It makes
use of peer-to-peer networks.
Future research could examine the costs and benefits of those and other alternatives.
CONNECT WITH ANOTHER VC-COMPLIANT IMS
Processing messages from other systems is not trivial. Hence, we recommend taking this
research as a foundation for future research aiming to connect to another VC-compliant
IMS. Important to mention is that the organization developing and maintaining the VC-
compliant IMS is willing to help. Otherwise, the risk of failure and frustration is high.
STUDY VC CONCEPTS NOT SUPPORTED BY IRMA
In section 4.3, we list advanced concepts of VC, which IRMA currently does not support. In
particular, those are status, refreshing, terms of use, evidence, and disputes. Also, we did not
succeed in implementing data encoding schemes. Hence, investigating in future work how
those concepts fit into IRMA, can be valuable for the PbDF.
STUDY RELATED STANDARDS OR RFCS
The W3C and other organizations continue working on other standards or RFCs related to
user-centric IdM, for instance, the previously mentioned “Web Authentication API”. Addi-
tionally, the W3C is working on a standard, called “Credential Handler API”.4 It defines an
API that can handle credential requests and credential storage.
Aries RFC 0036 “Issue Credential Protocol 1.0” describes a possible protocol to be used
in an issuing session.5 Aries RFC 0037 “Present Proof Protocol 1.0” describes a possible
protocol to be used in a disclosing session.6
It might be insightful to compare and contrast those protocols and APIs with the proto-
cols and APIs of IRMA.
STUDY NON-TECHNICAL CHALLENGES
A further research direction can be to identify the non-technical challenges further. Then,
different advice or solutions can be identified, possibly together with other organizations or
legislators. For instance, how GDPR can contribute to advance the concept of user-centric
2For IRMA, Timen Olthof developed a proof-of-concept to decentralize the scheme via the Ethereum
blockchain, see https://github.com/timenolthof/irmaethereumscheme
3See official website under https://ipfs.io/
4See https://w3c-ccg.github.io/credential-handler-api/
5See repository on GitHub: https://github.com/hyperledger/aries-rfcs/tree/master/features/
0036-issue-credential
6See repository on GitHub: https://github.com/hyperledger/aries-rfcs/blob/master/features/
0037-present-proof/
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IMS. Alternatively, one could also think about developing a governance framework, which
can be employed across user-centric IMS.
8.3.2. IMPROVEMENT IDEAS FOR THE W3C
GIVE INTEGRATED EXAMPLES
To understand concepts more clearly, it helps to have good examples. Hence, a more in-
tegrated example of how to employ VC can be helpful for future implementers. Currently,
most examples within the VC data model are independent. For instance, it could help to
understand the concept of the data encoding schema better.
ELABORATE MORE ON PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION
The goal of permissionless innovation is described very briefly in the specification. If a sys-
tem becomes more extensible, the more complicated it might become. Thus, it is harder to
maintain. Hence, more elaboration on extensibility and permissionless innovation might
help future implementers.
RELATE WITH OTHER WORK
For others, it might be useful to have an overview that brings different standards and ini-
tiatives from the W3C together, which may make it more accessible for researchers and en-
gineers. For identity-related work, for instance, the “Credentials Community Group” might




In this research, we explored the relation between IRMA and VC. We revealed that the goal
of the VC standard is to advance interoperability between user-centric, decentral IMSs. We
conclude that by making IRMA comply with the VC standard, IRMA at least reaches level
three of LCIM, possibly even level four. Consequently, IRMA extends its interoperability.
Then, if other IMSs comply with the VC standard and implement IRMAs protocol, users
of the IRMA app can use their attributes outside of the IRMA system. Also, IRMA issuers
can issue attributes to non-IRMA users. By making IRMA comply with the VC standard
based on the modifications we described, we can also conclude that IRMA does not en-
hance other features, such as increase the privacy of its users.
After comparing and contrasting IRMA and VC, we discovered that roles, key concepts
such as claims, credentials, and presentations overlap between IRMA and VC. Also, VC pro-
motes the concept of ZKPs, and IRMA employs it. VC supports the JSON syntax, and IRMA
uses it. The developed prototype shows that it might be manageable to adapt IRMA to
comply with the VC-standard.
It is one thing to modify IRMA to comply with the VC standard. It is another, however, to
achieve interoperability between different VC-conforming IMSs due to several challenges.
One is that other VC-compliant systems can employ different (cryptographic) protocols,
APIs, and technologies. This can have a profound impact on IRMA’s security properties.
Another challenge is legal and cultural issues. We need to identify and discuss them more
broadly with legislators and society as a whole.
We advised the PbDF to modify IRMA to become compliant with the VC standard. If
the PbDF invests now in interoperability for decentral, user-centric IMSs, it might become
a pioneer in the field. Consequently, it might help to reduce the resistance of individuals
to use those systems. Also, as the public understands the advantages better, it can even in-
crease the acceptance of the public for those systems. This might lead to more investments.
However, the costs for the PbDF are initial investments and increased complexity of IRMA.
We decided within the scope of this research to not modify the IRMA data model. Also,
we did not succeed in establishing an active collaboration with another project. This could
have enabled us to show how to exchange messages with another VC-compliant system.
Therefore, we proposed several recommendations for future work for the PbDF. First,
examine alternatives to decentralize the IRMA scheme. Second, research about other VC-
compliant IMS, with which IRMA can connect. Third, study concepts of VC that IRMA
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currently does not support. Fourth, study related standards and RFCs. At last, study legal
and social challenges, and subsequently, provide advice or solutions.
Also, we shared ideas for improvement with the W3C. In particular, W3C can give inte-
grated examples to understand certain concepts better. Also, elaborate more on the impact
of permissionless innovation. Lastly, it can help implementers and researchers to relate
work, such as VC, with other initiatives in the same field.
In general, within the field of identity management, and in particular, within decen-
tral, user-centric IdM, we are missing a unified approach to interoperability by the industry
and legislators. In the end, it would benefit all citizens if the industry builds interoperable,
decentralized, and user-centric solutions. Hence, institutions (especially the EU) and the
industry together should invest more resources to advance the field. They can take existing
work (for instance, FIDIS and ABC4Trust) and new technological developments to build up
new knowledge subsequently. At least, due to standards such as VC, new concepts such as
SSI, and legislations such as GDPR, we see some progress within the field.
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Provided by Greg Alpar: “IRMA is a new kind of authentication method. It provides a new
way to prove information about your identity to a website. Traditionally, authentication is
a proof of a unique identifier. For instance, if a username is an identifier, the correspond-
ing password is the proof that the username belongs to you. Similarly, if a citizen number
(such as a BSN) is an identifier, a driving license, an identity card or a successful DigID
authentication can be its proof.
In IRMA one uses attributes instead of identifiers. Attributes are properties or qualifica-
tions of a person. The fact that you are over 18 years of age or you are a resident of Belgium
are attributes of yours. But because your name and your citizen number are also examples
for attributes, attributes can be considered as a generalisation of identifiers. Attributes in
IRMA are issued by authoritative parties and protected by advanced cryptographic tech-
niques. As an example, each field in your passport is an attribute (name, passport number,
nationality, etc.) which can be issued by some Dutch authority. You can read much more
about the IRMA technology on the Privacy by Design Foundation’s website.
Since IRMA provides many powerful applications, it is ready to be rolled out in many
contexts. The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) works to develop Web standards. One
of its recent proposals is the ‘Verifiable Claims Data Model and Representations’. Its aim
is to define a “a standard way to express these sorts of claims on the Web in a way that is
cryptographically secure, privacy respecting, and automatically verifiable”.
The goal of this project is to create IRMA Verifiable Claims. This entails a common un-
derstanding of the IRMA and the Verifiable Claims infrastructure and to develop a working
IRMA implementation that complies with the W3C infrastructure.
(Remark: As the W3C proposal is in a draft phase, it accepts recommendations, which




To give the reader of a better understanding of the protocol implemented within IRMA,
we describe for the issuance and disclosure process the interaction between actors and
components.
B.1. ISSUANCE
In figure B.1 a sequence diagram shows how the IRMA issuance process works. The follow-
ing text describes each step in more detail.
Figure B.1: IRMA issuance process
1. The user can choose to load attributes by opening IRMA’s attribute issuance website;
2. After selecting an issuer the user will be redirected to the issuer’s website;
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3. The issuer informs the irma server that it wants to issue certain attributes (optionally,
with certain values) to the user (see listing 4 for the related JSON request);
4. If the irma server validates the request successfully, it will return a session token (see
listing 5 for the related response) which is then translated into an QRCode that the
user needs to scan;
5. After the user scans the QRCode, the app sends the session token to the irma server
(from IRMA server console: method=GET type=client url=/irma/eFTj0ar7vEIagyrOLyGx/)
and the server sends the unsigned attributes to the IRMA app along with a nonce;
6. If the user agrees to receive this credential, first the client needs to compute a com-
mitment which uses the earlier received nonce, and then sending the commitment
to the server, see 6 .
7. If the server verifies the proofs, it returns a message back to the app containing the
signature which proofs that the credentials are valid and can be used by the user in
later disclosure sessions (see listing 7 for the message);
8. At last, a confirmation message is send to the user (see listing 8 for the actual JSON
message).
B.2. DISCLOSURE
In figure B.2 a sequence diagram shows how the IRMA disclosure process works. The fol-
lowing text describes each step in more detail.
1. When the user decided to identify herself via IRMA to a verifier, the verifier sends a
request to the IRMA server to start a disclosure session;
2. If the IRMA server accepts the request, it assigns a session token to it and returns the
content of the QRCode that the verifying party shall display to the user. The QRCode
contains the URL to itself and the session token.
3. Then, the user scans the QRCode which results in a GET request from the app to the
/irma/ endpoint. The response contains the attributes that need to be disclosed (see
listing 9);
4. The app let the user choose which attributes she wants to disclose (“selective disclo-
sure”);
5. The app generates the response based on the selected attributes by attaching a valid
proof of knowledg (see listing 10 for the related response);
6. The verifiers IRMA server can verify the attributes by verifying the proof of knowledge
and consequently, either grants or denies the access to the requested object.
The initiation of the session between verifier, irma server and the end user is omitted
here as it is already explained in the above issuance section.
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Figure B.2: IRMA disclosure process
B.2. DISCLOSURE 77
















78 B. IRMA PROTOCOL





























In this appendix, we list the absolute requirements and prohibitons of the VC data model.
In the following list we describe absolute requirements of a verifiable credential:
• @context property must be present and must be one or more URIs;
• @context first value must be https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1;
• @context subsequent items can be objects that express context information;
• type property must be present and must be one or more URIs;
• type properties must contain at least VerifiableCredential;
• credentialSubject property must be present;
• credentialSubject is defined as a set of objects that contain one or more properties
that are related to the subject of a VC;
• issuer property must be present;
• issuer property must be a single URI;
• issuanceDate property must be present;
• issuanceDate must be an ISO8601 datetime;
• proof property must be present;
• proof property must include specific method using the type property.
In the following list we describe absolute requirements of a verifiable presentation:
• Presentations must be of type VerifiablePresentation;
• type property must be present and must be one or more URIs;
• type properties must be at least VerifiablePresentation;
• Presentations must include verifiableCredential and proof.
In the following list we describe absolute requirements of a verifiable if that credential
is used in ZKP systems:
• credentialSchema must be present;
• proof must be present.
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In the following list we describe absolute requirements and prohibitons of a verifiable
presentation when used in combination with ZKP:
• each derived VC must have a credentialSchema present;
• a verifiable presentation must not leak information to enable verifiers to correlate the
holder across presentations;
• proof must be present to enable verifiers to assess that all derived VCs are from the
same holder. be present.
D
SACCS CHARACTERISTICS
In this appendix chapter we describe certain SACCS charateristics. Without a description it
is hard to understand them, and the given motivation.
D.1. ARCHITECTURE CHARACTERISTICS
D.1.1. LOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS
Layers Indicates the hierarchical layers of a system.
Inheritance Structure Parent-child-sibling relationship between modules. In go this would
either be realized by implementing an interface, or by adding a struct within a struct.1
Module Decomposition The system at varying levels of abstraction, for example having
modules for the UI, business logic and database operations.
Source Structure Related to the structure of source code, i.E. files and imports of files in
other files.
Dependency Relationship Describes the system modules and relations between them.
D.1.2. RUNTIME CHARACTERISTICS
Control Flow Processing Interaction of system processes through a pipeline representa-
tion of the architecture.
Repository Access Database and accessor relationship of the system.
Concurrent Processes Interaction of processes as system threads.
Component Interaction Sharing of information between components.
Distributed Components Shows how remote processes interact via interfaces.
Component Deployment Shows components and their location on system hardware.
1See for a good explanation: https://hackthology.com/object-oriented-inheritance-in-go.html
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D.2. FEATURES
The descriptions are copied from Williams and Carver [40].
Devices Hardware devices used by the system.
Data Access Receipt of data from external systems or repositories.
Data Transfer Flow of data from system to external systems.
System Interface Software interfaces with external systems.
User Interface Human-computer interaction interfaces.
Communication Protocols used to interface other systems or data.
Computation Algorithm function and modification of data.
Input/Output Format of information processed by the system.
D.3. QUALITY ATTRIBUTES
The quality attributes are based on ISO 25010. Since ISO 25010 did not exist yet, when
Williams and Carver [40] published their paper, we decided to use the quality attributes
listed in ISO 25010.2
Functionality suitability Degree to which a system provides functions that meet needs of
stakeholders. Sub-attributes are: completeness, correctness and appropriateness.
Performance efficiency Degree to which a system provides performance relative to amount
of resources under certain conditions. Sub-attributes are time behaviour, resource
utilization and capactiy.
Reliability Degree to which a system performs certain functions under specificed conddi-
tions. Sub-attributes are maturity, availability, fault tolerance and recoverability.
Usability Degree to which users can recognize if a system is appropriate for their needs.
Sub-attributes are learnability, operability, user error protection, UI aesthetics and
accessibility.
Security Degree to which a system protects information and data. Sub-attributes are con-
fidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, accountability, confidentiality, authenticity.
Compatibility Degree to which a system can exchange information with other products.
Sub-attributes are co-existence and interoperability.
Maintainability Degree of effectiveness and efficiency with which a system can be mod-
ified. Sub-attributes are modularity, reusability, analysability, modifiability, testabil-
ity.
Transferability Degree to which a system can be transferred from one environment, or be
replaced. Sub-attributes are portability, adaptability, installability, replaceability.




In this appendix we describe how to set up IRMA to run the prototype, and results of run-
ning the prototype. First, we explain how to prepare the irmago and irma_mobile reposito-
ries, and run the different components. Then, we show the results of the modifications in
both an issuing and disclosing session.
E.1. PREPARATION
1. If you already have IRMA repositories in your $GOPATH, move them to a different
location;
2. If not, you need to set up both IRMA components as described in the corresponding
READMEs of IRMA, and then move them to a different location;
3. Clone both GitHub repositories listed in section 6.8 into your $GOPATH, and make
sure to have the daniel branches checked out;
4. Install the irma binary by executing go install ./irma within the irmago project;
5. To start the metadata server, execute irma server metadata -vv (-vv foor additional
logging);
6. Connect an Android phone via USB, and verify that the device is visible with the com-
mand adb devices;1
7. Go to the irma_mobile directory, and execute the commands yarn install, dep ensure,
and ./irmago_copy_and_run in that order.2
E.2. ISSUING SESSION
We already set the flag IssueVC to true within irmago, hence when set up correctly, the app
shall communicate a commitment-VC.
Execute the following steps to retrieve a VC via an issuing session:
1As I only have an Android phone, I only validated the changes on the Android platform.
2Unfortunately, if you already have a newer IRMA app version installed, you need to remove it manually.
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1. Start an IRMA server via irma server -vv;
2. Initiate an issuing session via irma session –server http://localhost:8088 –issue irma-
demo.MijnOverheid.ageLower=yes,yes,yes,yes;
3. Scan the QRCode with the IRMA app;
4. Check that you received the ageLower credential on your phone;
5. Check that the session status is DONE;
6. If everythings works well, within the terminal of the running IRMA server, you see the
messages printed.
One message is the actual VC, as visibile in listing 11. The @context contains the manda-
tory first item and appended the IRMA issuance URI currently used within IRMA. The first
type element is VerifiableCredential as this message is a VC. The second type element refers
to the type information, in this case from the MijnOverheid issuer belonging to the irma-
demo scheme with as type fullName. The issuer information, when dereferenced via the
given URL resolves to, amongst others, the public key of the issuer, see listing 12. The cre-
dentialSubject contains the attributes in plain text. The proof section contains the signa-
ture of the credentials, whereby the default IRMA proof message is added under the gabi
element. Also, due to the implementation of the Validator interface within the VC struct,
the IRMA app requests the schema and validates the VC, as shown in screenshot E.1 Addi-
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Listing 13: ageLower JSON schema
E.3. DISCLOSING SESSION
1. Start an IRMA disclosing session via the IRMA command: irma session –server
http://localhost:8088 –disclose irma-demo.MijnOverheid.ageLower.over21;
2. From the console of the IRMA server, copy the URL from the session response to be
able to create the content of the QRCode;
3. Apply the following template for generating the content of the QRCode:
{"url":"«URL»","action":"disclosing", "system":"sovrin"};
4. Via for example the website https://www.the-qrcode-generator.com/ generate
the QR (an example is shown in figure E.2);
5. After scanning the QRCode with the IRMA app, and approving the request, check that
the verifiable presentation is printed in the IRMA server console; see listing 14 for an
example;
6. Check that the proofStatus of the session is VALID; it proves that the disclosing is
successful.
Figure E.2: A QRCode from another system










































































Listing 14: Disclosed ageLower credential in a verifiable presentation
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In this chapter, I write about my experiences conducting this research.
Initially, the literature study was extensive, as I had to understand both IRMA and VC
in great detail. To be able to modify the IRMA software, I had to learn the go programming
language. Then, I had to understand the IRMA source code.
During the project, I had some issues with figuring out which research method to fol-
low. This work was more about creating some software related artifacts. It was less about
gathering data, and reason about it, as it is common with empirical research. Hence, it took
some time until I figured that the design science approach could fit my needs. Only quite
late, I revised the introduction and research questions extensively. This resulted in a better
guideline to follow for rest of the research.1 Additionally, finalizing the thesis took more
time than anticipated.
All in all, I can state that after multiple iterations, and additional study of material with
regards to design science, I am satisfied with the structure and content of the research.
I advise the Open Universiteit to lecture students about “Design Science” as it might be
helpful during the graduation project.
I used the book “Style: Lessons in Clarity and Grace” (from Williams and Bizup) to im-
prove my English writing skills.
In my opinion, students can use my thesis as a template when conducting a compare
and contrast research, and additionally, developing a software artifact. Initially, I explain in
detail how to conduct the research based on DSRM, thereby describing which artifacts to
create. Then, I describe the topics the research is about extensively. Afterward, I identify
requirements, modifications, and the impact of the modifications. Based on a subset of the
modifications, I show how to develop a prototype. Finally, the related work and following
discussion help to put everything into context.




ABC Attribute Based Credential.
API Application Programming Interface.
CA Certificate Authority.
eIDAS electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust Services.
ERD Entity Relationship Diagram.
EU European Union.
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation.
IAM Identity and Access Management.
Idemix IBM Identity Mixer.
IdM Identity Management.
IMS Identity Management System.
IRMA I Reveal My Attributes.
LCIM Levels of Conceptual Interoperability.
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology.
PbDF Privacy by Design Foundation.





W3C World Wide Web Consortium.
ZKP Zero-Knowledge Proofs.
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